Education and the poverty trap in rural China by Knight, John et al.
www.ssoar.info
Education and the poverty trap in rural China
Knight, John; Shi, Li; Quheng, Deng
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Knight, J., Shi, L., & Quheng, D. (2007). Education and the poverty trap in rural China. (RECOUP Working Papers,
11). Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education, Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and
Poverty (RECOUP). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-68622
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
RECOUP Working Paper 11
Education and the Poverty Trap 
in Rural China
John Knight, Li Shi and Deng Quheng
University of Oxford
December 2007
 1
© 2007 Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty       WP07/11 
 
 
 
 
 
RECOUP Working Paper No. 11 
 
 
Education and the Poverty Trap in Rural China 
 
John Knight, Li Shi and Deng Quheng 
 
University of Oxford 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This is an ambitious attempt to view the relationships involving education and income as forming a 
system, and one that can generate a poverty trap. The setting is rural China, and the data are from a national 
household survey for 2002, designed with research hypotheses in mind. Enrolment is high in rural China by 
comparison with most poor rural societies, but the quality of education varies greatly. There are three main 
strands to the paper. One examines the determinants of enrolment, and finds that poverty has an adverse effect 
on both the quality and quantity of education - so contributing to a poverty trap. The second examines the effects 
of education. It shows how and why the returns to education vary according to household and community 
income – so also contributing to a poverty trap. The third strand brings no fewer than 17 estimated relationships 
together as a system, and poses the question: can education break the vicious circle of poverty? The implications 
for poverty analysis and for educational policy are considered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This research project falls within the DfID-funded Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and 
Poverty (RECOUP). It exploits an existing data set, which was partly designed with our research questions in 
mind. It can be seen as a prototype for research on the four countries on which the Programme is concentrating: 
India, Pakistan, Kenya and Ghana. The most interesting comparative study, at a later stage of the Programme, 
would be of China with its giant counterpart, India: rural China has much higher educational attainment and also 
enrolment than does rural India, and an analysis of the reasons for, and consequences of, this difference would 
be instructive. 
China provides an appropriate case study on the relationships between education and poverty. By 
comparison with the rural areas of the four countries that are being examined in depth within the programme, 
rural China provides better educational access, certainly at the primary level, probably at the secondary level, 
and possibly at the tertiary level. However, there is a wide variation in both the quantity and quality of 
educational provision, by province, by county and by village. This variation reflects the decentralised system by 
which public education is funded. Poor areas are at a disadvantage. Moreover, if the general marketisation of the 
Chinese economy has meant that school fees and charges have become more important, the educational access of 
poor rural households, even within a village, may have deteriorated, at least in relative terms and possibly in 
absolute terms. 
The contribution of this paper is to show that education and poverty are closely related in numerous 
ways, and that the interactions among a set of poverty-related and education-related variables are capable of 
generating a vicious circle of educational deprivation and poverty, and also a virtuous circle of positive 
interaction between education and income. The web of hypothesised relationships is estimated empirically for 
rural China, and the nature of the resultant poverty trap is captured. Their complexity and simultaneous 
determination in an interrelated system, together with the cross-section nature of our data set, makes it difficult 
to establish causation, as opposed to association, among our variables. Nevertheless, we believe the results to be 
original not only for China but also more generally for poor countries, and to be sufficiently suggestive as to 
provide a road map for further research into the causal mechanisms. 
 
2. Background 
China is unusual among poor developing countries in that it is approaching universal basic education. 
The Law of Nine-Year Compulsory Education, passed in 1986, envisaged that all children would receive this 
minimum education, commonly 6 years of primary school and 3 years of ‘middle’ (or ‘lower secondary’) school. 
For implementation, the country was divided into three areas. Cities and economically advanced areas 
(accounting for 25 percent of the population) were to realise the 9-year target by 1990, areas of middle 
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development (50 percent of the population) by 1995, but no deadline was set for the economically backward 
areas (25 percent of the population). 
The implementation of the policy is decentralised. In the rural areas county governments have the 
responsibility to enforce the policy but township (corresponding to the former commune) governments actually 
carry it out. With economic reform, the fiscal system moved towards decentralisation and self-finance. The 
majority of government funding for rural education comes from the lowest levels (village, township and county). 
As fiscal pressures intensified with the decline in redistributive budgetary transfers, rural local authorities 
resorted to imposing a variety of user fees and charges. 
By law primary school is supposed to be free but in practice various fees have been levied: fees for 
tuition, for textbooks and for uniforms, and ‘financial contributions’ and other school-based fees or charges. On 
the basis of ability to pay, we expect to find lower user charges in poorer areas. On the basis of community 
revenue, however, we expect poorer areas to rely more heavily on user charges. There is likely to be great spatial 
variation, not only in the quantity but also in the quality of the provision of compulsory education. School 
quality has emerged as an important policy concern in rural China.  
Nearly all children attend their local primary school, normally located in their village, and it is common 
to attend a middle school outside the village but inside the township (normally comprising several villages). The 
quality of schooling varies greatly. At one end of the scale there is the ‘teaching point’ to be found in poor, 
small, remote localities. This is a one-room school house (often dilapidated) with a single teacher (often with no 
more than middle school education) instructing all children within walking distance. At the other extreme, 
schools in the wealthy rural areas may have well qualified teachers and be equipped with libraries, science 
laboratories, etc. 
A study (Liu et al, 2005) based on interviews with 800 primary- and middle-school principals in poor 
rural areas of Hebei Province in 2002/3 provides evidence that the quality of education is a serious problem. The 
average number of pupils per class was 49 in primary schools and 61 in middle schools, and in the latter 16 
percent of classes had more than 75 pupils. The majority (53 percent) of teachers in primary schools had no more 
than 12 years of education and training, and 28 percent of middle school teachers were not qualified. No less 
than 45 percent of teachers in these schools were not being paid the full amount of their salary or were not being 
paid on time. The problem stems from the decentralised nature of the funding of compulsory education, which 
was also evident from their survey. Only 7 percent of funds came from central or provincial governments, 11 
percent from county governments, 9 percent from township governments, and the remaining 73 percent from 
village revenues or tuition fees. 
At the post-compulsory level - the three years of high (or ‘senior secondary’) school – there tends to be 
educational rationing in rural areas. Pupils performing well in examinations can continue to high school, but only 
if they can afford to pay the school fees. The quality of high school education is in turn important for success in 
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the competitive national examination that gives access to tertiary education and thence to the high income and 
urban life that college graduation normally offers. 
Taken together, these institutional features suggest that poverty at both the household and the 
community levels can have an adverse effect on the quantity and also the quality of education that a child in rural 
China receives. 
The data set that we use is the rural component of the national household survey for China, relating to 
2002, that was designed by an international team including the authors and organised and administered by the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IE, CASS). In addition to the main ‘Rural 
Household Questionnaire’, there was an ‘Administrative Village Questionnaire’ and a ‘Social Network, Village 
Affairs and Living Quality’ Questionnaire. Both of these latter questionnaires contain questions that were 
introduced especially for our current purposes. 
 
3. Literature review 
Several research papers have explicitly examined the determinants or the consequences of school of 
enrolment in rural China. We summarise the most relevant briefly for the results that may help in the formulation 
of hypotheses given our particular research questions and data set. First, we examine the effects of poverty on 
education. 
  
3.1 The determinants of enrolment 
Knight and Li (1996) used the rural sub-sample of a 1988 national household survey to conduct a logit 
analysis of enrolment for the 14-19 age-group. They found significant coefficients on: male sex (positive), 
minority status (negative), (predicted) household income (positive, and large in effect), and province mean 
household income (positive, but small in effect). They posed the question: is rural education demand- or supply-
constrained? A second logit, confined to the poorest quarter of households, introduced two new, and significant, 
variables: opportunity cost of education (negative) and rate of return to education (positive), both measured at 
the county level. This suggested that the educational decisions of poor households are predictable demand 
responses to economic incentives. In estimating the determinants of school fees, they found that province income 
per capita has a positive effect, suggesting that fees represent quality of education or that richer provinces offer 
higher rates of return to education, for instance because larger subsidies offer better opportunities for progress up 
the competitive educational ladder. The authors’ household income functions also showed the opportunity cost 
of education to rise and become important between the ages of 14 and 19. 
Connelly and Zheng (2003) used a sample of microdata files from the 1990 population census to 
examine the determinants of enrolment of 10-18 year olds. Their data set is able to control for village fixed 
effects but lacks many of the plausible explanatory variables, including information on household income and 
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any variables representing school quality. Their concentration is on primary school: their dependent variables are 
whether children attended primary school, or graduated from primary school. The variables that increased the 
probability of attendance or completion include: whether parents attended primary school, whether parents 
attended middle school, the village school attendance rate, and income per capita in the county (administratively 
gathered). The presence of siblings decreased girls’ chances of schooling. 
Brown and Park (2002) specifically examined the effect of poverty on the educational enrolment and 
outcomes of children aged 5-16, using a 1997 survey of households and schools from poor counties in six 
provinces. Their measure of household wealth was expenditure per capita (excluding expenditure on education), 
and they defined a household to be ‘poor and credit-constrained’ if it is in the bottom third of both expenditure 
per capita and access to credit. Using a proportional hazard model, they found that children are more likely to 
drop out of school if the household is poor and credit-constrained (their most important result), if they have 
fewer siblings, if the father has less education, if the mother had not taken the enrolment decision, and if school 
fees (possibly proxying school quality)are lower. The sibling result was interpreted as indicating that siblings are 
complementary rather  than competitors for resources, and the fees result as an indication that higher fees 
improve the quality of education and hence the rate of return. The authors found the test score (for enrolled 
pupils) to be higher if expenditure per capita is higher (implying that it improves quality), if there are older 
siblings, and for girls (suggesting that the less able girls drop out of school). However, their variables 
representing school quality (the pupil-teacher ratio, the proportion of rain-proof classrooms, and proportion of 
teachers with post-secondary education) had no significant effects on test scores. 
Appleton et al. (2006) use the rural sub-sample of a national household survey for 1995 to examine 
gender differences in educational enrolment rates and educational expenditures. Differences appear only beyond 
compulsory school age, and so the authors concentrate on the age group 15-18. They find gender differences in 
enrolment to be particularly pronounced in poorer households. The coefficient on household income per capita is 
positive and significant for girls but not for boys. This is interpreted as suggesting that girls’ schooling is a 
luxury good whereas boys’ is an investment good. Maternal education has a positive and significant effect on 
enrolment and on educational spending, whereas the effect of paternal education is weaker. The estimation of 
household income functions provided an economic explanation for the preferential treatment of boys: the 
coefficients on years of schooling indicate that the return to female education is not different from zero whereas 
the return to male education, although low, is significantly positive. 
De Brauw and Giles (2006) examine the effect of migrant opportunities on high school enrolment in 
rural China. They use a Ministry of Agriculture panel of households in 52 villages to predict high school 
enrolment with a set of household and village variables including the number of migrants from the village. This 
proves not to have a significant coefficient. However, it is plausible that migrant numbers are endogenous to 
enrolment, e.g. better roads and transport can increase both migration and enrolment, or an adverse income 
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shock can increase migration but tighten credit constraints on enrolment. The panel provides an instrument for 
migrant numbers (years since the issue of national identity cards in the village) and the instrumented variable 
then yields a robust significant negative coefficient. The implication is that migrant opportunities, by raising the 
opportunity cost of schooling, deter high school enrolment. However, the study lacks good data, such as 
household income, which might indicate the effects of poverty on schooling. 
Gustafsson and Li (2004) used the rural sub-samples of the 1988 and 1995 national household surveys to 
measure the effect of educational expenditure on poverty. Mean real expenditure on education rose sharply 
across the deciles of household income per capita in both 1988 and 1995, but especially in 1995, whereas 
household expenditure on education expressed as a proportion of income fell sharply across the deciles. Real 
expenditure on education increased rapidly over that period, and in 1995 it represented 3.6 percent of income for 
the sample as a whole but 7.3 percent for the poorest decile. Using the US$1 PPP poverty line, the headcount 
index of poverty in rural China fell by 2.2 percent points over the seven years, but with educational expenditures 
deducted from income, the fall was merely 0.6  percent points. Indeed, the exclusion of educational expenditures 
made an even greater difference in the officially designated ‘poor counties’. 
3.2 The effects of education 
Secondly, we consider reverse causation in the relationship between education and poverty: the effects 
of education on income. Yang (2004) examined the contribution of education to rural incomes during the period 
of factor market liberalisation 1986-1995, when the relaxation of controls permitted households to reallocate 
resources from agricultural to non-agricultural activities. Using panel data for Sichuan Province, he found that 
households with a better educated member responded to the new opportunities by devoting more labour and 
capital to non-agricultural activities that yielded higher returns, and that this contributed to the growth of their 
household incomes. Thus, the effect of education was indirect: it had no direct effect in the household profit 
function. 
A panel of rural households and workers for the years 1988-1996 was used to argue that education is 
becoming increasingly important as a determinant of opportunities and income (Zhang et al, 2002). At the first 
stage of the analysis, a logit analysis estimated the determinants of off-farm work. In 1988 the coefficients of the 
education variables were insignificant but the village dummy coefficients were important. By 1996 the education 
terms had become positive, significantly so, and substantial whereas villages had no reliable effect. At the 
second stage, the education terms were not significant as determinants of non-farm income in 1988, but they had 
become positive and significant by 1996. 
The way in which some Chinese villages get caught in poverty traps and some manage to escape is 
documented by Knight and Li (1997), who examined several villages in two counties of Hebei province. 
Villages which were close together geographically could nevertheless be far apart economically. The explanation 
provided was in terms of factor immobility and processes of cumulative causation. Although a good natural 
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resource base helped to initiate the process, the main cause of differential village development was non-farm 
sources of income: migration and village industry. Both were constrained and the easing of constraints involved 
path-dependent cumulative processes. For instance, migration required a village network of information and 
contacts, and village industrialisation depended on the accumulation of local skills through a process of learning-
by-doing and on the reinvestment of profits. The need for self-reliance meant that village expenditures on 
infrastructure and education depended heavily on the existence of non-farm activities in the village, but 
education could itself be important for generating non-farm activities.  
Knight and Song (2003, 2005, ch. 8) investigated Chinese peasant choices among three activities: 
farming, local non-farming and migration. Their source was a rural labour force survey conducted in 8 provinces 
in 1994. The picture they obtained was one of peasants having a powerful economic incentive to diversify, or 
move entirely, out of agriculture but being constrained in various ways from doing so. The marginal return to 
non-farm labour – whether in local or migrant activities – are much higher than the very low marginal return on 
the farm. Moreover, workers who specialise in non-farm activities work many more days a year than specialist 
farmers, so enabling them to be more fully employed. Education sharply raises the probability of access to both 
non-farm activities, monotonically so in the case of village industry. These results suggest that education raises 
the incomes of rural people by improving their access to non-farm activities, in which conditional incomes are 
generally higher and in which the conditional returns to education are also higher. 
 
4. Theory and hypotheses: the vicious circle of poverty 
4.1 Poverty traps 
These research results suggest that we adopt the following theoretical framework and explore the 
following set of hypotheses using the rural sub-sample of the 2002 national household survey. Our basic 
hypothesis is that it is easy for households to be trapped in a vicious circle of poverty. Poverty itself can prevent 
them from grasping the economic opportunities and making the investments which could break the vicious circle 
and lift them out of poverty. A ‘poverty trap’ or ‘low-level equilibrium trap’ can be a general phenomenon, 
associated with lack of savings and of access to credit, absence of productive social networks, scarcity of local 
economic opportunities, and the debilitating effects of a ‘culture of poverty’. For instance, Bowles et al. (2006) 
argue that there are many conditions that can trap individuals or groups in intractable poverty. These include the 
existence of critical thresholds, dysfunctional institutions, and neighbourhood effects, each of which can give 
rise to multiple equilibria. Similarly, Ray (2004), in discussing new research in development economics, 
concentrates on the potential for there to be more than one equilibrium, and for ‘bad’ equilibria – being socially 
inefficient although privately profitable - to perpetuate inequality and poverty: the task is then to find policies 
capable of tipping from one equilibrium to another. 
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In this paper, however, we concentrate on the potential role of education – its absence or presence - in 
making or breaking the vicious circle of poverty. Postulating a vicious circle requires justification. There is some 
to be found in the literature. For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) theorise that, given initial high inequality, 
liquidity constraints and set-up costs, it is possible that poor households will not invest in education, so locking 
their descendants into a poverty trap and perpetuating the inequality. Barham et al. (1995) develop a model in 
which households differ in their ability to accumulate human capital owing to their facing different rates of 
return to investment in education and having different capabilities to fund educational expenditures. They show 
that liquidity constraints can give rise to a poverty trap, in which able children remain uneducated and therefore 
poor. Durlauf (2006) argues that social interactions can explain persistent inequality across localities. For 
instance, an absence of role models in a poor locality causes children to develop lower labour market aspirations 
and thus lower educational aspirations. 
The following provides a theoretical framework. We distinguish effects that operate through the 
individual or the household, on the one hand, and the community, on the other. At the individual or household 
level, educational enrolment can be constrained by lack of savings and by credit constraints. Household income, 
which would otherwise be irrelevant to a decision to invest in education, might therefore influence enrolment. 
The need for additional household current income might require that children work and thus raise the 
opportunity cost of enrolment. Poverty might reduce the prospective rate of return to education. There are 
several channels through which this can operate: ill-health, and physical and mental stunting, of the child; weak 
and unproductive social network to provide economic opportunities; limited productive assets with which to 
combine human capital; credit constraints which raise the cost of, and thus lower the return to, education; and 
risk aversion which requires a premium on the return to the investment. For various reasons, the education of 
parents might encourage the enrolment of their children: their own schooling experience might give the parents a 
‘taste’ for education which then motivates their children; and they might impart out-of-school cognitive skills to 
their children, helping them to perform well at school. If uneducated parents are less successful in these matters, 
educational deprivation can be transmitted from one generation to another. 
At the community level: the poverty of the community might mean that there is no local school, so 
raising the transport costs of school attendance or making it prohibitive. Inadequate community funding for 
education can reduce the quality of school provision, so decreasing its prospective rate of return. The rationing 
of places at post-compulsory levels of education implies that poor school quality at the compulsory levels might 
prevent access to the high rates of return further up the educational ladder, so deterring even compulsory school 
enrolment. The lack of local tax revenue can also, or alternatively, necessitate higher school fees being charged, 
so reducing the prospective rate of return or causing credit constraints to bind. There might also be a low rate of 
return to education generally in a poor community on account of a lack of local productive economic 
opportunities. A more general phenomenon, which envelopes these categories, is the ‘culture of poverty’ that can 
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take hold in a poor community and which dulls supply initiatives and demand incentives. For instance, a low 
level of education in the community – whether among adults or children - can set a social norm for education 
and deter individual investment beyond the social norm. 
We start with an elementary illustration of a basic poverty trap involving just education, income and a 
credit constraint. Consider a simple model in which education in years (E) is a function of income (Y) and 
income in turn is a function of education. What are the conditions required for the existence both of low-level 
equilibrium poverty trap and also of a high-level equilibrium? Figure 1 illustrates. Assume that the education 
function E = E (Y,…) is inverse-S shaped to reflect the insensitivity of  education to income when income is low 
(the effect of binding wealth and credit constraints), its sensitivity over a range of income, and its dependence 
only on the rate of return to education when wealth and credit constraints become irrelevant. The income 
function Y = Y (E,…) can be linear, convex or concave without necessarily altering the analysis. In the figure we 
show it to be concave: income rises with education but at a diminishing rate. 
The equilibrium of E and Y at point a is locally stable: small divergences result in a move back to a. 
However, there is a second equilibrium at point b, which is locally unstable. Thus, an exogenous increase in 
education from E1 to a level less than E2 leads in time, through interaction between the functions, to a restoration 
of equilibrium: the ensuing rise in income is insufficient to sustain that level of education, and in due course both 
income and education decline to point a. However, if education can be raised above the threshold, from E1 to a 
level beyond E2, interaction then raises both education and income. A third equilibrium is reached at point c, 
corresponding to education E3, which is stable on account of the declining sensitivity and eventual insensitivity 
of education to income. 
The other determinants of Y and of E may be such that some households face only one equilibrium. 
Thus, a sufficiently large vertical rise in Y = Y (E,…) – e.g. through investment in physical capital or an increase 
in product price - would confine a household to the high-level equilibrium, and a sufficiently large fall would 
confine it to the low-level equilibrium. Similarly, a sufficiently large vertical fall or rise in E = E (Y,…) – e.g. 
through improved access to credit or an increased subsidy of education, or their reverse, would have the same 
respective consequences. 
This very simple model is intended to illustrate two things. First, it is possible for a household to be 
stuck in a low-level poverty trap, involving both low education and low income. Second, there is a potential 
escape from poverty, at least for some households. A large enough intervention to raise education might go 
through the threshold and propel the household to another equilibrium involving higher levels of education and 
income. However, in reality, the forces creating vicious and virtuous circles are more complex than that and 
involve many more interdependent variables. 
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4.2 The interdependent system 
We set up a system of interdependent equations. They are not simultaneous equations in the sense that 
they are not all contemporaneously determined, involving as they do some relationships from one generation to 
another. They illustrate the nature of the vicious and virtuous circles that that generate a poverty trap or spring an 
escape from it. Where 
 
  EP =   parental education 
  EC =   community education 
  YC =   community income 
  Y =   income 
  EN =   educational enrolment in years 
  EQ =   educational quality 
  HE =   health 
  HA =   happiness 
 
 We have five equations, each dependent on some or all of the others. 
 
  Y =   Y ( EN, EQ, HE )    (1) 
  EN =   EN ( EP , EC , EQ, Y, YC , HE )  (2) 
  EQ =   EQ ( Y, YC  )    (3) 
  HE =   HE ( Y, EN )     (4) 
  HA =   HA ( EN, Y, HE )    (5) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the same set of relationships, labelling each one with an alphabetical letter. Consider 
first the direct and indirect determinants of education. At the household level, and within the same generation, 
there is a positive effect of adult health on household income (A), the positive effect of household income on 
adult health (B), and the positive effect of child health on enrolment (C). From one generation to the next, 
household income improves child health (again B), child enrolment (D) and also educational quality (E), and 
parental education encourages child enrolment (F). At the community level, within a generation, community 
income influences community enrolment (G), the quality of education being provided boosts the demand for 
enrolment (I), and enrolment at the community level may encourage enrolment at the individual level (J). Across 
generations, adult educational attainment in the community encourages child enrolment (again J), community 
income influences enrolment (K) and improves educational quality (L).  
There are also outcomes of education, each operating on the generation being educated: educational 
enrolment of the child raises the income of the subsequent adult (M), educational quality also subsequently 
raises income (N), and educational enrolment subsequently improves the health of the person being educated 
(O). Happiness, normally referred to in the literature as subjective well-being or satisfaction with life, depends 
positively on education (P), income (Q), and health (R). 
We intend in this paper to estimate as many of these relationships as possible. Our basic hypotheses are, 
first, that poverty at both the household and community levels adversely affects both the quantity and quality of 
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education that children receive, and second, that the quantity and quality of education help to raise households 
out of poverty. We intend to explore the numerous education-related processes and mechanisms which can 
create a poverty trap and which can enable households to emerge from poverty. 
This set of hypotheses is already broad and ambitious. Nevertheless, it leaves out several mechanisms by 
which education can make or break the vicious circle of poverty. The social benefits of education can extend 
beyond the private economic returns. For instance, education can generate production externalities: the 
productivity of farm households can be raised by the education of other farmers in the locality (for instance, 
Weir and Knight 2004, Weir and Knight 2006, for Ethiopia). However, such additional hypotheses fall beyond 
the scope of this research. 
   
5. Descriptive information 
Primary school normally takes 6 years to complete, middle school 3 years, and high school 3 years. No 
less than 84 percent of children in the sample were enrolled by the age of 7. We therefore take the age group 7-
12 to be representative of primary school enrolment, 13-15 to correspond to middle school enrolment, and 16-18 
to be relevant for high school. Table 1 shows the enrolment rates in these age groups, for boys, girls and total. 
We see that the primary school enrolment rate is remarkably high (at 95 percent), as is the middle school 
enrolment rate (90 percent). All but a small minority of children attend the compulsory years of school. Only in 
the non-compulsory high school years does the enrolment rate fall sharply (55 percent). 
Nevertheless, Table 2 establishes that household income is important to schooling decisions. It uses the 
detailed information collected on 7-16 year-olds to contrast three categories of 15 and 16 year-olds: those who 
did not complete their compulsory education, i.e., dropouts before the end of middle school; those who had 
completed compulsory education but were no longer in school; and those who had completed middle school and 
were currently in school (refer to the three groups as early dropouts, middle school graduates, and high school 
pupils). The table shows the five quintiles of households ranked by income per capita. If teenagers are enrolled 
in school, the household is liable to forgo income and thus its income may be lower. Because school enrolment 
can reduce household income, we simulate household income to correct for this effect, as will be explained in 
Section 6. Contrast the poorest households (the first quintile) with the richest (the fifth). Among the children in 
poor households, 48 percent were early dropouts, 23 percent middle school graduates, and 29 percent high 
school pupils. The corresponding proportions for those in the richest households were 14 percent, 13 percent, 
and 74 percent. The ratios of early dropouts to high school pupils are very different: 1.65 and 0.18 respectively. 
The fourth row of Table 2 shows the enrolment rate of 15-18 year-olds (whatever their level of education). The 
rate rises monotonically, from 52 percent in the first quintile to 73 percent in the fifth quintile. 
In Table 3 we investigate whether household expenditure on each child in school varies with income. In 
the upper half of the table our criterion for classifying households into the bottom, middle and top thirds is 
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household income per capita, and in the lower half our criterion is county income per capita, aggregated over all 
sampled households in the county. We see that both tuition fees and other educational spending (including that 
on uniforms and textbooks) vary greatly across the three household income groups, and that this is true of all 
three age groups. In the oldest age group (16-18) the ratio of the top to the bottom income group exceeds 2 to 1.  
It is the same for both tuition fees and other educational expenditure. 
A further point to note from the table is the existence of large differences in expenditure per pupil 
according to age group. The ratio of expenditures in the age groups corresponding to primary, middle and high 
school are roughly 1 : 2 : 4. For instance, considering the poorest third of households, the ratios are 1 : 1.81 : 
3.64 for tuition fees and 1 : 1.93 : 3.49 for total expenditures. The direct costs of schooling increase substantially 
as children enter middle school and again as they enter high school. 
We expect average county income per capita to serve as a proxy for public expenditure per pupil. If that 
is the case, the amount that households need to spend might be higher in poorer counties. However, we see from 
Table 3 that, for household expenditure per pupil, the ratio of the richest to the poorest third of counties 
generally exceeds 2 to 1.  This gives us a strong hint - for further analysis below - that poor households, and also 
households in poor counties, suffer from poor quality education. 
Despite the large differences in household expenditure per pupil, the burden of educational expenditure 
on household budgets is actually greater for poorer households. The final row of Table 2 expresses total 
educational expenditure of the household as a percentage of (simulated) household income. We see that this falls 
almost monotonically, from no less than 26 percent in the poorest quintile to 7 percent in the richest. For the 
poorest quintile to have to pay a quarter of their income on education is indeed a burden. 
 
6. The determinants of enrolment 
Given that the enrolment rates are so high in the age groups relevant to compulsory education, the 
estimation of enrolment functions predicting enrolment at that level is not very informative. Instead, we show the 
activity status of children currently out of school (Table 4). The few children of primary school age who are not 
enrolled are mostly still waiting to attend school (33 percent) or not economically active (at least 40 percent). 
Among dropouts of middle school age, most (at least 59 percent) are not economically active, but a minority (24 
percent) are working. No fewer than 72 percent of the dropouts of high school age are at work, but at least 15 
percent are not economically active. Thus, by no means all dropouts find work, at least immediately, but at high 
school age the choice is largely between employment and enrolment. 
The general questionnaire of the rural survey gathered information on the education of all individuals, 
but the specially designed education module sought more detailed information on the education of children in the 
age group 7-16. Our analysis combines the two sources. Examining the children aged 15 or 16, there are three 
groups of interest: dropouts before the end of middle school, dropouts at the end of middle school, and those 
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continuing after middle school. 25 percent of those who had attended middle school had left school without 
completing, and of those children (here we can extend the age group to 15-18) who had completed middle 
school, 41 percent continued to be enrolled in high school. We pose two key questions. First, why do some 
children drop out of middle school before they complete their compulsory education? Second, why do some 
children continue into high school after they complete their compulsory education? 
A key variable in our various estimations is income. However, income may well be endogenous, either 
because it is partly determined jointly with enrolment (omitted variables) or because it is itself partly determined 
by enrolment (reverse causation). In order to measure the causal effects of income, it is necessary to simulate this 
variable or to instrument it. We use a measure of income which standardises for the loss of income that 
enrolment, with consequent withdrawal of labour, might cause: we calculate both farm and non-farm average 
hourly labour income at the county level, multiply these by the working hours of children of the relevant age 
group in the household, and subtract this sum from actual household income to get simulated income. This 
eliminates the difference in household income that is attributable to the greater hours worked by dropouts. 
Without such a correction, there is a danger that the coefficient of income in an enrolment function will be 
biased downwards. That is the most likely source of bias. However, it is also possible that parents work harder to 
fund the education of their children, in which case there can be upward bias. There is a case for instrumenting 
income in a way that corrects for both sorts of bias. The difficulty, however, lies in finding valid instruments, as 
nearly all the variables at our disposal might influence the opportunity cost of enrolment. After experimentation 
we chose to use the identifying variables reported in the notes to Table 6. Generally, however, we use simulated 
rather than instrumented income in our estimations. 
 
6.1 Explaining middle school drop-out 
The implementation of the compulsory education programme is dependent on the financial capacity of 
local governments. It is inevitable that the programme is more thwarted in the poorer areas. Even in the less poor 
areas, the rapidly rising tuition fees of recent years may prevent some children from completing compulsory 
education. Table 5 presents the results of a binary logit analysis estimating the determinants of premature 
dropping out from middle school. The dependent variable is equal to one if the child had not completed middle 
school and equal to zero for completion. For each independent variable it shows the coefficient and the marginal 
effect. Two specifications are shown, one with simulated ln income and the other with five simulated income 
quintile dummy variables, intended to explore non-linearities in the effects of income. 
There are different ways in which to categorise the explanatory variables. One classification is according 
to demand-side, supply-side, and combined demand-and supply-side factors. However, given our interest in the 
role of poverty, we classify the determinants as poverty-related at the household level, poverty-related at the 
community level, other household variables, and other community variables. 
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Consider first the poverty-related household variables. Simulated ln household income per capita has a 
highly significant negative coefficient: income reduces the probability of dropping out early (column 1). The 
marginal effect implies that a fall in income by one standard deviation increases the probability of dropping out 
early by 4.3 percentage points. As the actual dropout rate is 21.2 percent, this represents an increase of 20.3 
percent. However, in the alternative specification (column 2) we see that the relationship is non-linear: only the 
lowest income quintile has a coefficient significantly different from zero. The large positive coefficient implies 
that being in the poorest quintile of households (instead of in the middle quintile) increases the probability of 
dropping out early by 9.2  percentage points, or by 43.4 percent.  
Whether the household perceives itself to be subject to a credit constraint is a second indicator of 
poverty. The coefficient on the variable indicating that the respondent’s household would not be able to borrow 
5,000 yuan if it was urgently needed is positive but not quite significant. As lack of credit is often a concomitant 
of low income, we consider also their combined effect: an F-test (for column 1) shows that they are jointly 
significant at the 2 percent level. An indicator of temporary poverty is provided by the household reporting a 
natural disaster in 2002. Entered as a dummy variable, it has a significantly positive coefficient: a recent spell of 
poverty increases the probability of premature dropping out by 5.5 percentage points (25.9 percent). Poverty is 
indeed an obstacle to the completion of compulsory education. 
Parental education is an indirect indicator of household poverty. The coefficients on years of schooling 
of both father and mother are negative, as expected, but the coefficient is significant only in the case of the 
mother. For instance, if the mother completed middle school instead of primary school, the probability of early 
dropout would be diminished by 3.6  percentage points (17.0 percent) (column 1). Thus, the intergenerational 
transmission of educational outcomes may also perpetuate the poverty of a household. There can be sibling 
competition for educational resources within a resource-constrained household. We therefore include the 
possession of a brother and of a sister as explanatory variables, but in neither specification are the coefficients 
significantly different from zero. 
We have four other individual or household variables. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating 
that the child is in poor health is positive, as expected, and implies that poor health increases the probability of 
dropout substantially but the coefficient is not statistically significant, either because there are only 24 cases or 
because unhealthy children do not get as far even as middle school. We find unexpectedly that being male 
actually increases the chances of early withdrawal: by 6.1 percentage points (28.8 percent) (column 2). Self-
assessment of performance at middle school is highly significant: those who reported that their performance was 
good had a probability of early dropout 18.7 percentage points (88.2 percent) lower (column 2). We examine 
below the determinants of middle school performance and find that it is weakened by poverty (Table 9). Finally, 
we introduce a dummy variable indicating that one or both parents are currently migrants. On the one hand, 
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migrant parents might be a source of school fees but,on the other hand, schooling might be neglected if parents 
are absent. However, the coefficient has a different sign in the two specifications and is not at all significant. 
Consider how community-level variables affect early dropout from compulsory education. The main 
unit for analysis is the county (average population about half a million) as only ten households are sampled 
within each village – too few to provide reliable means.  The county (simulated) mean per capita income of 
sampled households has a positive but insignificant sign. County prosperity has two contradictory effects. On the 
one hand, local government is better able to subsidise compulsory education; on the other hand, local prosperity 
raises the opportunity cost of education for teenagers. If it is not a matter of chance, the positive coefficient 
implies that the latter effect prevails.  
Another possible indicator of the opportunity cost of middle school attendance is the migration density 
in the county: the proportion of workers who are working outside the county is likely to reduce the search and 
psychological costs of migration. The existence of migration opportunities can have two contradictory effects: it 
can encourage teenagers to leave school early in order to earn wages as migrants that are higher than they can get 
in the village, or it can encourage them to stay on at school because the returns to education in migrant 
employment may be greater than the returns to education in the village. The coefficient is significantly negative: 
a rise by one standard deviation in the proportion of migrants lowers the probability of early dropout by 3.2 
percentage points (15.0 percent). This implies that the latter effect is the more important. As this variable might 
be endogenous, we use a valid instrument – farm land per capita – to predict migration intensity. However, the 
coefficient is barely altered, and the Wald test of exogeneity indicates that instrumenting is unnecessary.The 
distance between the household and the nearest middle school has a positive but slight and insignificant effect, 
possibly because this distance is typically small (mean 3.8 kilometres). 
Certain counties are designated as ‘poor counties’ by central or province governments. Designated poor 
counties receive special funds from the national or provincial government to help them overcome their poverty. 
We introduced a dummy variable denoting that a county was designated in that way, to find out whether this 
support helps to reduce dropout from middle school. In each case the coefficient is negative, as expected, but far 
from being significant; nor does its inclusion alter the coefficients on income. Designated poor counties are no 
different in the matter of early dropout from compulsory education. Fiscal support from the higher tiers of 
government does not appear to help them to achieve universal compulsory education. 
The equation contains two variables to proxy the quality of education in the county. One is the 
proportion of adults aged 25-34 in the county who had attended high school. The coefficient is negative and 
highly significant: a reduction of the proportion by one standard deviation raises the probability of early drop-out 
by 5.7 percentage points (26.7 percent) (column 2). This rise may reflect the lower chances of progressing to 
high school when entry is more restricted or a lower quality of education being received. On average 45 percent 
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of people reported dissatisfaction with the quality of secondary education in their county. The coefficient on the 
proportion expressing dissatisfaction in the county is positive, as expected, but not quite significant.. 
The theoretical concept for assessing the demand for education is the private rate of return to education. 
We estimated the return to a year of schooling at the community level. It was necessary to estimate the returns 
separately for farming (normally a household self-employment activity) and non-farming (often an individual 
wage employment activity), but this was helpful as the estimated returns were distinctly different, with the 
returns being generally higher in non-farm (province mean 3.4 percent) than in farm activities (county mean 1.2 
percent). We estimated both returns at both the county and the province level. In the probit equations the variable 
for the returns in farming performed better at the county level and the variable for the returns in non-farming 
performed better at the province level. Thus, it appears that the relevant returns in farming are perceived to be 
those at the county level, whereas the relevant returns in non-farm activities relate to a larger area, the province, 
probably reflecting the greater mobility of non-farm labour. The rate of return to education may be important for 
those deciding whether to complete middle school. The coefficients on the return to a year of schooling in 
county farming and in province non-farming are both negative, as expected, but neither is statistically 
significant.  
Finally, we note the large and significantly negative coefficient on the county enrolment rate among 15-
16 year-olds. A reduction in this enrolment rate by one standard deviation increases the probability of 
withdrawal from middle school by 6.2 percentage points, or by 29.2 percent (column 2). The interpretation of 
this effect on individual enrolment is not straightforward (Manski 1993; Soeteven 2006). The problem is to 
identify the true relationship in the face of the ‘reflection’ problem – whether the mirror image causes a person’s 
behaviour or reflects it. The county enrolment rate may have an ‘endogenous’ social effect, i.e. a high enrolment 
of the reference group itself encourages individual enrolment by way of social norms or peer influences or 
bandwagon effects. The reverse of the coin is that in counties with a ‘culture of poverty’ the accepted social 
norm for education is low. The difficulty is to distinguish this effect from an ‘exogenous’ effect and a 
‘correlated’ effect, both of which can also influence individual enrolment. An exogenous effect depends not 
directly on the enrolment but on the characteristics of the group, which may be such as to encourage individual 
enrolment. A correlated effect arises if individuals enrol similarly because they have similar characteristics and 
face similar incentives to enrol. It is possible that the positive coefficient on the county enrolment rate is due to 
county characteristics that encourage the enrolment of individuals in the county and which are not included in 
the enrolment equation., e.g. because the county has a history of strong demand for, and hence supply of, 
education. 
 
 
 
 18
6.2 Explaining high school continuation  
Our second exercise is to examine the determinants of the decision to enrol in high school after 
completion of middle school. For the binary logit analysis, among those 15-18 year-olds who have completed 
compulsory education, the group still enrolled is given a value of one and the group now out of school a value of 
zero. Table 6 reports the results, again with two specifications of the income variable. With minor exceptions the 
same set of explanatory variables is employed. Some of the results are very similar (allowing for the change in 
sign implicit in the dependent variable) but a few are different. 
Consider the variables representing poverty at the household level. Simulated ln income per capita again 
has a significantly positive coefficient: an increase by one standard deviation increases the probability of 
enrolment by 18.1 percentage points (column 1); recalling that the mean enrolment proportion is 45.8 percent, 
this represents an increase of 39.6 percent. The alternative use of (simulated) income quintiles again shows that 
children in the poorest quintile have significantly worse access to high school, although in this case the 
probability of enrolment increases monotonically across the quintiles (column 2). Thus, a child in the lowest 
quintile has a probability of being enrolled in high school  23.2 percentage points (50.8 percent) below, and one 
in the richest quintile a  probability 17.7 percentage points (38.6 percent) above, a child in the middle quintile. 
Moreover, if a household reports that it cannot raise a loan, there is a significant negative effect:  the probability 
of high school enrolment is reduced by 21.1 percentage points, or by 46.1 percent (column 1). Thus, the poor and 
credit-constrained are at a huge disadvantage in gaining access to high school. 
The education of both parents has a positive and significant effect. Three extra years of schooling 
(corresponding to a rise in educational level from primary school to middle school, or from middle school to 
high school) for the father raises the probability of high school enrolment by 4.2 percentage points (9.2 percent), 
and for the mother by 3.0  percentage points (6.6 percent) (column 1). There is evidence that siblings compete 
for household resources: the coefficient on the presence of a brother is negative and significant, implying that the 
probability of continuing to high school is reduced by 7.2 percentage points (15.7 percent) (column1). 
Insofar as poverty affects performance at middle school, there is a further mechanism by which the poor 
are disadvantaged. A report of good performance has a positive and significant coefficient: the probability of 
continuing beyond middle school is raised by no less than 32.5 percentage points (71.0 percent) (column 1), 
reflecting the competitive nature of access to high school. As in the case of middle school dropout, the 
coefficient on poor health has the expected sign but it is not significantly different from zero. However, a more 
stringent definition of ill-health, creating only 15 cases, does produce a significant and very substantial effect. 
There are some interesting contrasts between Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, against expectations, a boy was 
shown to be more likely than a girl to drop out of middle school. In Table 6 the significant positive coefficient 
indicates the opposite: a boy has a 5.6 percentage point (12.2 percent) higher probability of continuing to high 
school (column 1). Whereas having at least one migrant (away from the county) parent was not significant in the 
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middle school equation, that coefficient is significant and positive in the high school equation, increasing the 
probability of enrolment by 12.2 percentage points (26.6 percent). Migrant remittances can be a source of funds 
for the payment of high school fees and charges; indeed, the need to make such payments might provide a 
motive for migration. 
We turn to the community influences on high school enrolment decisions. County ln income per capita 
has a significant negative coefficient: an increase by one standard deviation reduces the probability of high 
school enrolment by 13.3 percentage points (29.1 percent) (column 1).  The migration density of the county has 
a significant positive sign: a rise by one standard deviation raises that probability by 4.3 percentage points (9.4 
percent) (column 1). We again instrument migration density using farm land per capita in the county. In this case 
the Wald test of exogeneity is failed. For instance, there might be some unobserved variable, such as the 
ambition of local people, that explains both the dependent and the independent variable alike and masks a 
negative causal relationship. However, in both equations the effect of instrumenting is to raise the positive 
coefficient (e.g. from the reported 1.413*** in column 1 to 2.522***). Whereas county income appears to proxy 
the opportunity cost of high school enrolment, the income prospect from migration opportunities does not 
perform that role. 
Considering the variables that might represent the quality of education, both the proportion of adults 
aged 25-34 who completed high school and the proportion of children at middle and high school who attend ‘key 
schools’ (schools that are given more public resources, charge higher fees, and have competitive entry) have 
positive coefficients, as expected, but neither coefficient is significant. However, the coefficient on the mean 
level of high school fees in the county is positive, significant and important: a one standard deviation rise 
increases the probability of high school enrolment by 9.2 percentage points (20.1 percent) (column 2). We take 
this variable to represent the quality of high school education in the county, and its coefficient to represent the 
effect of quality on demand. Finally, the coefficient on the proportion of households in the county expressing 
discontent with the quality of secondary schools is significantly positive. This surprising effect – the opposite of 
the equivalent result in the equation for predicting middle school drop-out  - might reflect the high expectations 
of those whose children continue to high school and the likelihood that many respondents answer by reference to 
the local middle school whereas their children attend a more distant high school. 
The coefficient on the county rate of return to a year of education in farming is significantly positive. It 
implies that the probability of high school enrolment rises by 3.8  percentage points (8.3 percent) if the return 
rises by one standard deviation (column 2). The province rate of return in non-farm activities is also positive but 
not quite significant. These results suggest that the private demand for high school education is responsive to the 
prospective returns. Finally, the coefficient on the county enrolment rate for 15-18 year-olds is significantly 
positive: a one standard deviation increase in that rate boosts an individual’s probability of high school 
enrolment by 16.5 percentage points (35.9 percent) (column 2). This is consistent with a bandwagon effect that 
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can make or break an educational vicious circle, or with some unobserved factor influencing both dependent and 
independent variables, e.g. a county tradition of valuing education highly. 
We made an attempt to estimate the drop-out and continuation equations using instrumented income 
instead of simulated income. Unfortunately, estimation with necessarily weak instruments reduced the precision 
of the estimates and, in the full equation, the coefficients on income were no longer significant. Our solution was 
to estimate a restricted model, retaining only the explanatory variables that were less likely to be correlated with 
poverty so that the income variable would be the sole proxy for poverty. The results are shown in Table 6. 
Poverty does indeed deter completion of middle school significantly: a fall in income by one standard deviation 
raises the probability of drop-out by 13.5 percentage points (57 percent) (column 1). Poverty also impedes 
continuation to high school: the same fall in income reduces the chances of continuing by 9.7 percentage points ( 
21 percent) (column 2). In the estimations to come we generally use simulated rather than instrumented income. 
 
7. Further links in the circle of deprivation 
The foregoing analysis of the determinants of education suggests that there are further links in the 
vicious circle of poverty that deserve to be explored. Some of the variables that appeared to be important as 
determinants of enrolment in Section 6 do themselves need to be explained, so as to discover the underlying 
rather than the proximate determinants. In particular, we wish to explore whether poverty is a determinant of 
certain variables that do not themselves represent poverty. These include the county enrolment rate, performance 
in middle school, health status, the community rate of return to education, and the quality of education. 
7.1 Explaining the influence of community 
  Given the importance of the county enrolment rate in encouraging individual enrolment, we explore the 
determinants of this variable, using information on the 122 counties in the sample. Table 7 has as the dependent 
variable the county enrolment rate of those aged 16-18, and as the independent variables a set of county 
characteristics. The county enrolment rate is positively influenced by the (simulated) income of the county. An 
income rise by one standard deviation increases the enrolment rate by 5.2 percentage points, i.e. by 9.2 percent. 
This result is consistent with households being credit-constrained and local governments being budget-
constrained. The coefficients on the terms representing the return to a year of education in farming and in non-
farming at the county and province level respectively are both positive, as expected, but not quite significant. An 
indication that the quality of county education is an inducement to enrolment is given by the positive and 
significant coefficient on the proportion of young adults who attended key schools: a rise by one standard 
deviation increases the enrolment rate by 3.4 percentage points (6.0 percent). The argument that education begets 
more education is consistent with the positive and significant coefficient on the proportion of young adults who 
completed high school: a one standard deviation rise increases the enrolment rate by 4.7 percentage points (8.3 
percent). The proportion of workers engaged in non-farm activities in the county appears to raise the enrolment 
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rate but this effect could arise by chance. In summary, we conclude that the availability and quality of education, 
and the means to pay for it, are factors which underlie the county enrolment rate, which in turn plays an 
important role in determining household enrolment decisions. 
The theoretical criterion for the enrolment decision is the private rate of return to education. Non-farm 
activities are normally carried out on an individual basis whereas farm activities are normally carried out by 
households. Because this distinction requires different methods of estimation (as will be explained in Section 8), 
the returns are reported separately for farm and for non-farm activities. In any case, the annual returns at the 
county level are very different, averaging 1.4 percent in farming and 4.0 percent in non-farming. Table 8 reports 
the determinants of the county-level returns to a year of schooling. We see that mean household income per 
capita in the county has a significantly positive effect on the non-farm rate of return, possibly reflecting the 
greater productivity of human capital in a more developed local economy. Thus, it appears that the deterrent 
effect of mean county income per capita in the enrolment equations (Tables 4 and 5) reflects a high opportunity 
cost and not a low benefit of education. Taking the county mean value, household educational expenditure per 
capita has a significantly positive effect on the rate of return to education in farming. This suggests that the 
quality of education can be important in determining this rate of return, and it indicates a mechanism by which 
low quality of education can deter enrolment. Thus, the poor may be doubly disadvantaged. However, we cannot 
rule out reverse causation: a high rate of return may induce spending to improve educational quality; nor can we 
rule out the possibility that counties in which households spend little on education also suffer from a culture of 
poverty which deters complementary out-of-school human capital acquisition. Another indicator of educational  
quality, the proportion of adults in the county who attended key schools, is not a significant determinant of either 
rate of return, possibly because the proportions attending key schools and also remaining in the county are too 
small. 
 
7.2 Explaining school performance 
Respondents were asked about their school performance relative to their peers when at middle school or, 
if they had not attended middle school, their performance when at primary school. We analyse the replies of 
children aged 13-18. Half of them (50 percent) reported that their performance was either good or very good. 
This group takes the value one, and the rest the value zero, in our binary logit analysis. Such a self-reported 
indicator may be inaccurate and also biased (few respondents owned up to a bad or very bad performance) but 
our estimates produce plausible and statistically significant results (Table 9). We see that gender has no 
significant effect on performance, but both father’s and mother’s years of schooling have a significant positive 
effect. For instance, if the father completed middle school instead of primary school, the probability of 
performing well rises by 5.1 percentage points, or by 10.2 percent. When ln simulated household income per 
capita is included as a proxy for parental support for the child’s education (column1), it has a positive and 
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significant coefficient: a one standard deviation rise in this variable increase the chances of performing well by 
2.3 percentage points, or by 4.6 percent. However, when the highly correlated variable, ln educational 
expenditure, is included as well, the income coefficient is not significant and it is the educational expenditure 
variable that does the work (column 2). In other words, income has its main effect through enabling parents to 
spend more on their child. The marginal effect for ln expenditure indicates that an increase by one standard 
deviation increases the probability of performing well by 5.6 percentage points, or by 11.2 percent. The two 
variables with links to household poverty have significantly negative coefficients (column 1). A dummy variable 
indicating that the child works after school and another indicating that the child is not healthy reduce the 
probability of good performance by 4.1 and 19.7  percentage points respectively. 
 
7.3 Explaining the determinants of educational quality 
One important link is the role of educational quality. The enrolment functions contain explanatory 
variables that are serving as proxies for quality of education: these suggest that higher quality raises enrolment. 
However, the proxies are in turn influenced by the poverty of the household or the locality. The implication is 
that quality and quantity of education may interact positively, and that households can get stuck in a poverty trap 
because they experience both poorer quality and lesser quantity of education: the value of their human capital 
suffers in two ways. 
The quality of education that children receive can depend on the intensity with which they study. 
Moreover, children may need to study hard at primary and middle school if they are to succeed in the 
competition for entry to high school. If children from poor households are more likely to engage in work out of 
school, they may have less time for study and therefore may learn less and also have a smaller chance of 
securing a rationed high school place. This issue is explored in Table 10. We know whether certain activities are 
‘always performed after school’: farmwork, childcare, and housework. The table reports binomial logit estimates 
for participation in these activities. We concentrate on the variables which are both relevant to the hypothesis 
and statistically significant. We see that (simulated) income significantly reduces the probability of both 
farmwork and housework. There is also a negative effect when at least one parent is a migrant, suggesting that 
parental migration has its effect more through remittances than by leaving children to cope with household tasks. 
The variables indicating the quality of the child’s school – school fee, and attendance at a key school – each 
significantly reduces both farmwork and housework. The same is true of the variables that proxy the general 
quality of education in the county – village educational expenditure aggregated to the county level, and the 
proportion of county students aged 15-18 attending key schools. The table also shows that at least two of the 
activities are more likely if the child is older, or a girl, or comes from a minority group, or has younger siblings. 
In summary, Table 10 suggests that the value of human capital received by poor children is adversely affected by 
out-of-school work in two ways. There is the direct effect of household poverty in reducing the amount of study 
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time available, and the indirect effect which operates, at both household and county level, through the quality of 
schooling being received. Children lack the incentive to study hard if they cannot learn much at school, and if 
the prospect of continuing to high school is low. 
We have information on whether there is a primary school in the village and on the nature of that 
primary school. We had expected to find that poor children are less likely than others to have a village primary 
school and more likely to have a single classroom school rather than a full grade primary school. However, the 
poorest quintile of households, and the poorest quintile of villages, are not at a disadvantage in these respects. In 
fact, the proportion of households in villages without a primary school is actually lower for the poorest quintile 
of villages (11 percent) than for the richest quintile (30 percent). However, this result is likely to reflect the 
latter’s willingness to travel for higher quality education, probably in larger, better resourced, schools. 
Even in rural areas, children can face a choice of schools of varying quality. Schools may charge 
different fees and involve variation in other costs, including transport costs, uniform costs, and costs of materials 
and books. Independently of the school, parents can choose to boost their child’s education by buying more 
books and paying for extra tuition and other extracurricular activities. The quality of education as opposed to 
mere school attendance may be important both for the value of human capital acquired in school and for the 
prospects of entering the generally competitive and rationed system beyond compulsory education. The amount 
that parents spend on education may thus have a powerful effect on future outcomes. 
One of the issues underlying the quality of education is whether private and public expenditures on 
education are substitutes or complements. For given enrolments, if educational quality is constant, more public 
funding implies less private funding: there is less need to charge school fees. By contrast, if quality is a variable 
to be optimised, greater public funding might encourage households to spend privately on education: the 
required condition is that government spending raises the marginal benefit of private spending. A third 
possibility is that both government and household spending are similarly influenced by a third factor such as 
local prosperity. For instance, if poor households are credit-constrained and local governments in poor counties 
are budget-constrained, poverty can depress educational quality. Higher incomes in a county might then enable 
both local governments and households to increase their educational spending so as to bring educational quality 
towards the optimum level, which is governed by the rate of return to quality-enhancing expenditure. 
We analyse the determinants of household educational expenditure per child, conditional on the child 
being enrolled. Table 11 reports the results of OLS equations in which ln educational expenditure for children at 
primary, middle, and high school are the dependent variables, concentrating on the explanatory variables that 
illuminate the relationships between poverty at the household and community levels and educational quality. The 
(simulated) income variable has significant positive coefficients at all three levels. Parental migration, plausibly 
reflecting disposable income in the form of cash remittances, also significantly increases the amount spent, but 
significantly so only at middle school. The older sibling variables reduce expenditure significantly at high school 
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level, and the younger sibling variables do so at all three levels. This evidence of competition for household 
resources means that households are unable to spend as much as they would like on education. If households 
were not constrained, expenditure should reflect the rate of return to the investment and should not be influenced 
by the presence of siblings. A child’s attendance at a key (secondary) school involves substantial and significant 
additional expenditure. There is a strong and significant positive coefficient on county income per capita and on 
county educational expenditure per capita, each coefficient rising monotonically with educational level. The 
former is a proxy for the capacity of local governments to pay for education and the latter a direct but crude 
measure of actual payment. These results indicate that household expenditure is complementary to local 
government expenditure on education, and not a substitute for it. The implication is that, if schools are of higher 
quality, parents are in turn willing to invest more in educational quality for their children. 
We can learn more about the nature of this complementarity, and of its relationship to poverty, by 
distinguishing between household expenditure on school fees and on other educational inputs: expenditure on 
books, on uniforms, and a residual input. The most important of these components is the residual, which is likely 
to include out-of-school tuition. Table 12 reproduces Table 11 but distinguishes between fee and non-fee 
expenditures and converts the dependent variables into logarithmic form so as to assist comparison of relative 
sensitivity. Note that total educational expenditure rises from 426 yuan per child at primary school, to 882 yuan 
at middle school, and to 2,566 yuan at high school, and that school fees represent 48, 46, and 49  percent of the 
total respectively. An increase in simulated income by one standard deviation raises total educational 
expenditure per enrolled pupil by 2.7, 3.7, and 4.3 percent at primary, middle, and high school level respectively. 
The household income variable is no less important for other expenditure than for tuition fees. Other expenditure 
appears to be more sensitive than tuition fees to an increase in county income per capita at the primary and 
middle school levels but less so at the high school level. Local government educational expenditure per capita 
has more influence on household spending on tuition fees than on other items in middle schools.  
In summary of Tables 11 and 12, household educational expenditure per child rises with income per 
capita of the household, income per capita of the county, and also the county average of local government 
educational expenditure per capita. This is generally true of both tuition fees and of other, more discretionary, 
educational expenses. It appears that household and community prosperity improve both the quality of education 
provided in the schools and the quality of additional educational support provided by the parents, and that greater 
subsidisation by local government is associated with more, rather than less, household expenditure on a child’s 
education. 
 
8. The effects of education 
A potentially important link in the circle of deprivation is whether, and to what extent, the outcomes of 
education are less favourable for the poor than for the less poor. This effect can operate both through the poorer 
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quality of education that they receive and the poorer economic opportunities that they face. The main objective 
of this section is to examine the economic effects of education, concentrating  first on whether, and by what 
mechanisms, there are positive returns to education in rural China and, second, on whether household or 
community poverty reduces the prospective returns to investment in education. 
 
8.1 Education and allocation of labour between farm and non-farm activities 
The descriptive Table 13 shows how workers are allocated between farming and non-farming activities 
and, within the latter, between local and migrant activities. We classify farm workers and non-farm workers 
according to which activity they spend more time in, and local non-farm and migrant workers according to 
whether they are working in the county. Our purpose is to contrast poor households, and young workers, with 
others. 
In the sample as a whole, we see that the farm/non-farm  percentage division is 64/36, and the 
local/migration division of the 36 percent is 22/14. However, there is a marked difference between the poorest 
and the richest third of households: 75 percent of the former are in farming but only 52 percent of the latter. 
There is little difference in the importance of migration but a large difference in the importance of local non-
farm work: 12 percent and 34 percent respectively. A similar pattern is found in comparing the poorest and the 
richest third of counties, except that there is a larger difference in migration (favouring poorer counties), 
probably reflecting the role of migrant networks in fostering migration. We see again the heavy dependence on 
farming (73 percent) of the poorest half of households in the poorest half of counties. 
The relevance of age is seen in the row showing labour allocation among workers aged under 30 years. 
Non-farm activities are much more important for the young (accounting for 49 percent of workers) than for the 
old, especially migrant labour (accounting for 30 percent). For workers under 30 in the poorest half of 
households in the poorest half of counties, local non-farm opportunities are rare but migration is common (28 
percent being migrants). 
A further indication that the distinction between farm and non-farm activities is important for income is 
provided by the association between household income per capita decile and the distribution of activities. The 
proportion of non-farm hours worked to total hours worked (equal to 37 percent overall) rises monotonically 
from 14 percent in the lowest decile to 65 percent in the highest (table not shown).  Table 14 illustrates the 
reasons why and how this powerful association arises. It shows that the ratio of the average return per hour of 
labour in non-farm to that in farm activities is 1.91. At the margin, the ratio is far higher, at 11.92. We also see 
that the ratio of the return per hour of labour in local non-farming to that in migration is 1.51 on average and 
1.37 at the margin. These disparities are consistent with there being labour market segmentation and rationing of 
non-farm jobs, as argued by Knight and Song (2005, ch.8). If so, does education assist households to earn non-
farm income? 
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Educational decisions are liable to be based on the prospects facing young people. They face a roughly 
equal division of labour between farm and non-farm activities, and even those in poverty have reasonable 
prospects of non-farm employment. The role of education in determining whether people engage in farming or 
non-farming, and the returns to education in farming and non-farming, are therefore important issues. We 
explore them in turn, the hypothesis being that education can have both allocative and efficiency income 
benefits. 
Table 15 reports the relevant results of a multinomial logit analysis to predict the determinants of 
activity choice, the reference activity being farming. Men are more likely than women to be found in both local 
and migratory non-farm activity. The propensity to migrate falls with age but the chances of being in a local non-
farm job initially rises with age. Being healthy is important for both activities but more so for migration. The 
proportion of workers in the county who are migrants and the proportion who work locally off-farm have 
predictable effects: the migration of others greatly increases the chances of own-migration, probably through 
network effects, and high non-farm labour density is a sign of local employment opportunities.  
Education raises the chances of being in either of the non-farm activities, but especially if it is local 
rather than outside the county. For instance, the marginals imply that high school rather than primary school 
completion increases the probability of migrant work by 33 percentage points and of local non-farm work by no 
less than 64  percentage points. Thus, education is a lifeline for young people who wish to escape from the farm, 
whether their motive is economic or social. Very similar general results are obtained from equivalent analyses 
conducted on the sub-samples of workers in the poorest third of households and workers aged under 30. 
 
8.2 The economic benefits of education in farm and non-farm activities 
The benefits of education arise from two effects: an allocation affect and an efficiency effect. Our 
estimation strategy is as follows. It is necessary to instrument hours worked on account of its likely endogeneity: 
more hours may be worked if the returns are higher. We first estimate farm and non-farm working hours 
separately. A Tobit estimation is necessary owing to non-participation in an activity: the proportion of censored 
observations are 15 and 54 percent respectively for farm and non-farm work. The instrumented hours variable 
can then be included in the second-stage income functions which measure the benefits of education in farm and 
non-farm activities. 
Consider first the non-farm equation, based on data for individuals currently working but under 65 years 
of age. The key explanatory variables are the education categories, chosen rather than years of schooling so as to 
permit non-linearities and to assist policy analysis. We regress working hours also on self-rated health status, 
gender, age, age squared, and the county average hourly wage in farm and non-farm work. Table 16 presents the 
results: the coefficients, the marginals, and the decomposition of the marginals into that part due to change in the 
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number of hours worked given positive non-farm hours and that part due to change in the probability of working 
off-farm. All the coefficients except age are highly significant. 
We concentrate on the explanatory variables that are relevant to our hypothesis. The mean value of non-
farm hours worked is 732 hours per annum (14.1 hours a week). With no education as the omitted category, the 
education dummy coefficients are all positive and rise monotonically with education level. For instance, having 
high school instead of primary school education raises hours worked by 345 hours, two-thirds of this rise being 
due to the increased chance of participation. Education appears to encourage or enable workers both to 
participate in non-farm activities and also to work longer hours in them. A report of being in good health or very 
good health raises non-farm work by 109 hours. As expected, the county average non-farm wage raises hours 
worked and the corresponding farm wage lowers them, hours decline throughout the working life, and men work 
longer hours than women. Two demographic variables, the number of children aged under 16 and the number of 
old people over 65 in the household, which should not influence household income directly, are included as 
instrumental variables so that instrumented hours can be included in the income equation to come. 
An equivalent estimation for farm hours worked by individuals is reported in Table 17. Again, the 
education dummies and the health variable are the most directly relevant. The equation differs only in that three 
household variables are added: the amount of farm land cultivated, productive fixed assets, and the total number 
of labourers on the farm. The mean value of the dependent variable is 956 hours per annum (18.4 hours a week). 
All the coefficients except productive fixed assets (a poor proxy for specifically farm equipment) are highly 
significant. With no education again as the omitted category, the education dummy variables are all negative and 
rise monotonically in negative value. For instance, having high school instead of primary school education 
reduces hours worked on the farm by 110, two-thirds of which is due to a lower probability of working on the 
farm. This is the most important result of Tables 16 and 17: as education increases, so workers switch strongly to 
non-farm work and weakly from farm work. This result indicates the allocative benefit of education. 
Reporting good health increases farm work by 30 hours. As expected, a higher county average non-farm 
wage, by raising the household’s supply price, reduces farm hours. We also include the predicted number of non-
farm hours worked, as we expect non-farm work to be preferred if it can be obtained, and farm hours then to be 
adjusted. The coefficient is indeed significantly negative but its impact is small, the marginal having a value well 
under unity, suggesting that, with many rural households suffering from underemployment, non-farm work can 
be expanded without contracting farm work equivalently or even substantially. Farm hours continue to increase 
with age until the mid-forties. 
Table 18 reports the determinants of the non-farm income of individuals. Our dependent variables are 
absolute non-farm income, to assist the simulations to come, and also ln non-farm income. Consider column 2: 
income is higher for men than for women, and rises with age until the late forties. Being healthy raises income 
by 12 percent. The coefficients on the education dummy variables, beyond primary school, are large and highly 
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significant, and rise monotonically with education level. In the absolute income equation (column 3), the 
differences in coefficients show the marginal product of each education level. For instance, the marginal product 
of middle school is 481 yuan and that of high school is 417 yuan per annum. However, this understates the value 
of education to a worker because education also increases the number of non-farm hours worked. When the 
hours variable is excluded from the specification, the marginal product of middle school becomes 835 yuan and 
of high school 781 yuan per annum (equation not shown). 
The first column of Table 18 introduces three proxies for the quality of education that workers had 
received, each measured at the county level: the proportion of young adults who completed high school, the 
mean level of school fees per pupil, and the proportion of households that expressed dissatisfaction with the 
quality of secondary education. Each variable has the expected sign, and each is statistically significant when 
introduced singly. When they are entered together, they are jointly highly significant but, owing to their 
collinearity, only school fees remain significant. An increase in the county mean fee by one standard deviation 
raises non-farm income by 11.5 percent; and if all three variables are increased by one standard deviation, the 
gain is 22.0 percent. This suggests that the quality of education improves productivity in non-farm activities. 
Because farming is a household activity and a household contains workers of different educational 
levels, a different specification of the income function is required. In addition to farmland, productive fixed 
assets, and the proportion of household workers who are healthy, we include the number of (instrumented) farm 
hours worked by household workers at each educational level. The differences in the coefficients on these 
education-specific hours variables thus provide the marginal product per 1000 hours of each education level. 
Table 19 reports the results. As expected, farm land and productive fixed assets raise farm income. Poor 
health does not have an adverse effect, probably because there is plenty of underemployed household labour to 
draw on. All the education variables of interest are positive, highly significant, and rise with education level. The 
exception is college education: very few college graduates remain in the rural areas, and those who do remain 
are unlikely to farm except as a hobby. When we introduced the three county variables representing the quality 
of education that workers had received, as in Table 18, none proved to be significant (equation not shown). 
The marginal product, for 1,000 hours of farm work, of middle school is 44 yuan and of high school 26 
yuan (column 2). To make these figures comparable with those for non-farm activities, we multiply up in the 
proportion 1,519 (the average number of non-farm hours worked) to 1,000: the marginal products become 67 
and 40 yuan respectively Clearly, the marginal product of education in farming is much lower than in non-
farming. There are efficiency benefits of education in both farm and non-farm activities but they are 
considerably greater in the latter. 
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8.3 Simulating the effects on poverty of raising educational levels 
It is possible to make use of the estimates in Tables 17-19 to conduct a simulation analysis. The 
counterfactual question being posed is: what are the effects on the incidence of income poverty of improving the 
educational level of the rural labour force? We recognise that this is a simplistic exercise. We abstract form the 
long time lag between educational expansion and the consequent improvement in the income generation process, 
and from all the other relationships involving education and poverty for which this paper educes evidence. We 
also ignore the possibility that the intervention will alter the estimated relationships, e.g. by increasing 
competition for non-farm jobs among the educated, and the possibility that the economy will change before 
those being educated enter the labour market, e.g. by increasing the availability of non-farm jobs. 
We use two poverty lines, corresponding to the $1 a day and $2 a day concepts.  Converted into the 2002 
prices in rural China, these become 925 yuan and 1,850 yuan. Table 20 shows the results of this exercise. The 
first column reproduces the actual situation. It reports actual average farm income, non-farm income, other 
income and overall income. The mean numbers of farm and non-farm hours are also shown. Finally, it shows the 
actual proportion of rural households for which income per capita is under the $1 a day line (10.9 percent), and 
the proportion under the $2 a day line (43.0 percent). 
The first simulation is to assume that those with no education and those with primary education had 
completed middle school, i.e. compulsory education. The combination of the allocative and efficiency effects is 
to reduce ‘headcount’ poverty to 2.6 percent ($1 a day) and 27.3 percent ($2 a day).Our other simulation is to 
assume that every worker with education below high school instead had completed high school. The poverty 
rates fall dramatically, to 0.5 percent ($1 a day) and to 9.0 percent ($2 a day). These benefits stem from a 
reallocation of labour towards non-farm activities and the higher returns to education in such activities. 
 
8.4 Explaining differential returns to education 
The estimated returns to education in rural, or farming, activities in the developing world tend to be 
positive but low in absolute terms and in relation to the returns in urban, or non-farming, activities. Phillips 
(1994) in a meta-analysis of the returns to education in farming in developing countries  - covering 30 studies 
and 59 data sets - estimated an average rate of return to an additional four years of schooling of 9.5 percent, 
implying an annual return of 2.4 percent. In China, Li and Zhang (1998) found the returns to a year of education 
for farmers in Sichuan Province in 1990 to be 3.3 percent (average household education) or 2.7 percent (highest 
household education).We shall show below our own estimates of the return in farming to be variously 1.5 
percent (all rural households, however little they farm), 3.2 percent (traditional farming households) and 4.8 
percent (modern farming households) a year. The returns to education for farmers appear to be relatively low, 
both in China and more generally in poor countries. 
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The returns to education can be lower for poorer households either because the quality of their education 
is inferior or because their opportunities or resources are inferior. These adverse effects can operate at the 
household level or at the community level. Poor households may be unable to afford high quality education and 
may be limited in their economic opportunities by lack of resources, of information, and of ambition. In poor 
counties the quality of educational provision may be low, local economic opportunities may be scarce, and the 
local resource base or infrastructure may be weak. We hypothesise that poor households, and households in poor 
counties, face lower returns to their education. 
Table 21 shows the estimated returns to a year of schooling in farming, non-farming and combined 
activities, distinguishing between different sub-samples according to household or county income per capita. It is 
not clear what education variable should be used in the case of household production because knowledge is in 
principle transferable and available within the household. After experimentation we decided to use the greatest 
years of education among the farm workers (for farm income) and among all workers (for combined income) in 
the household. Conditioning variables are kept to a minimum because of the possibility that education works 
partly through them. 
In the sample as a whole the return to a year of education is much lower in farming (1.5 percent) than in 
non-farming (10.8 percent), and for household income as a whole (6.4 percent). The overall return corresponds 
to a weighted average of the two component returns, with the weight on non-farming rising with educational 
level (as was shown in Tables 15 and 16).  Including province dummy variables (and so estimating the within-
province returns), the pattern is similar although in each case the return is a bit lower; we report only the 
equations which do not condition on province.  
Our interest is in the contrast between the average, the poor and the rich. The estimates of the returns to 
schooling for income-based sub-samples are subject to downward bias owing to truncation, but comparisons of 
the returns for the different income groups are valid. In all three cases, the return for the poorest third of 
households is lower than that for the richest third, being less than half in the farming and combined cases. For 
instance, the overall return to a year of education is a paltry 2.0 percent for the poorest third of households and 
4.5 percent for the richest third. Poor households thus have less incentive than the non-poor to invest in 
education. Households in the bottom third of counties face distinctly lower returns in farming than do those in 
the top third. There are differences in returns both for poor households and for households in poor counties, 
suggesting that the problem must be addressed at both household and county levels. 
We search for the underlying reasons for the differential returns to education. The returns to education 
are likely to depend positively on the level of technology being used in the production process. Accordingly, 
they are likely to be greater not only in rural non-farming than in farming but also, within the latter, greater in 
‘modernising’ farming conditions than in a ‘traditional’ farming environment. Argument in support of this 
hypothesis is to be found in e.g. Schultz (1975), and summary evidence in a meta-analysis which found an 
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average return per year of schooling of 2.9 percent in modern farming and  of 1.9 percent in traditional farming 
(Phillips, 1994, p.155). 
We test the latter hypothesis in the following way. First, we identify ‘farming’ households. Our criterion 
is that the household derives the majority of its income from farm activities. Second, we distinguish between 
modern and traditional farming households on the basis of their relative emphasis on the traditional farm 
activity, grain production. Our necessarily crude definitions are that households which obtain the majority of 
their farm income from grain production are ‘traditional’ and those which obtain a minority are ‘modern’. We 
then estimate a farm income function, with three key explanatory variables: average years of education of the 
household workers, a ‘modern’ dummy variable, and a modern* years of education interaction term. The 
dependent variable is ln household farm income and the conditioning independent variables are land area used, 
hours of labour on the farm, and productive fixed assets. 
Table 22 reports the results. All the coefficients are significant. Being a modern farming household adds 
33 percent to income, and the rate of return to a year of education is 4.2 percent (column 1). However, when the 
modern* years of schooling interaction term is introduced (column 2), the coefficient on the interaction term is 
2.1 percent per year. The implication is that the return to a year of schooling is 2.7 percent among traditional 
farmers and 4.8 percent among modern farmers. This is powerful evidence that education is more valuable for 
farming households which are able and willing to diversify away from traditional crops.  
The subsequent analysis has shown that our simulation analysis of the effects of increasing education on 
poverty – being based on average relationships in the sample as a whole - may be misleading. Insofar as poor 
households face lower returns to education, the poverty gains will be overstated. Insofar as young people face 
better prospects of non-farm employment, the poverty gains will be understated. Accordingly, we redo the 
simulation analysis: first, for the poorest third of households and, secondly, for households of which the head is 
aged under 30 years. The results are different for two reasons. Not only are the values of the relevant 
characteristics of each sub-sample different from those of the sample as a whole, but also the equations are 
different. In both cases we re-estimate the equations in Tables 16-19 - on which the counterfactual simulation 
analysis is based - using only the sub-sample observations.  
Table 23 presents the results for the poorest third of households. The poverty rate is extremely high: 32 
percent are below the $1 a day line and 100 percent below the $2 a day line. Assuming that all workers have 
completed at least compulsory education has a trivial effect on the poverty rate at the higher line but reduces the 
rate at the lower line by over a third.  Giving all workers at least a high school education again has little effect on 
$2 a day poverty but reduces $1 a day poverty by almost two-thirds. Despite the poverty trap, the poorest can be 
helped out of their poverty by education. 
Table 24 reports the simulations for the sub-sample of young households. The baseline is quite similar to 
that for the sample as a whole: even though young individuals spend more time off the farm, their households 
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actually work fewer non-farm hours. However, the simulated falls in their poverty rates are somewhat greater, 
reflecting the strong tendency for the educated young to find non-farm employment. 
 
8.5 Education, poverty and health 
Individuals were asked to classify themselves on a five-rung health ladder, from very healthy to very 
unhealthy. 84 percent reported being healthy or very healthy: we distinguish this group of adults aged 16-65 
(taking a value of zero in the binary logit analysis) from the 16 percent whose health was so-so, bad, or very bad 
(taking a value of one). The explanatory variables are a dummy for male sex, age and age squared, a series of 
educational level dummies, and (instrumented) ln income per capita. All the variables predicting poor health 
have the expected sign and are significant at the 1 percent level (Table 25).  An individual is less likely to be 
unhealthy if he is male or young. The two variables of interest are the individual’s education and the household’s 
income. There is a significant fall in the chances of being unhealthy with educational level. For instance, having 
completed high school instead of middle school reduces that probability by 2.5 percentage points, i.e. by 14.4 
percent; and an increase in household income per capita by one standard deviation reduces it by 1.1 percentage 
points, i.e. by 6.5 percent. Thus, both income-poverty and education-poverty induce ill-health in adults. A binary 
probit equation to predict ill-health among children aged 0-15 was unable to find links to the poverty or the 
education of their parents: only male sex and age were significant, both reducing the probability of being 
unhealthy. 
 
8.6 Education, poverty and innovation 
Education may be important in fostering risk-taking behaviour in agriculture (Knight et al, 2003), and 
poverty may itself foster a culture of poverty in which enterprise, risk-taking, and innovation are repressed. The 
survey contained a question asking the respondent about their attitude to adopting new agricultural technology. 
The answers ranged from very positive to not at all positive. We create a dummy variable for ‘positive’ or ‘very 
positive’ replies, the other three replies being the reference category. In a binary logit equation, the explanatory 
variables are male sex, age and age squared, and years of schooling of the respondent, and ln household income 
per capita. We consider the sub-sample of ‘farming’ households, i.e. with more than half of their income from 
farming. The hypothesis is that both the education and the income variables have positive coefficients. 
Table 26 shows this indeed to be the case. When ln household income per capita is used, the coefficient 
is positive and highly significant (0.251), and raising the income variable by one standard deviation increases it 
by 3.4  percentage points, or by 4.9 percent (equation not shown). However, causation is questionable. For 
instance, an inhospitable terrain may produce both poverty and a negative attitude. In the table we therefore 
instrument the income variable. The coefficient on income is reduced to 0.088 and it is no longer significant. 
Raising education from primary to high school increases the probability of having a positive attitude to 
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innovation by 13.1 percentage points, or by 19.6 percent. This result, also, is open to criticism: more able people 
may be both more educated and more positive towards innovation. Correction of this potential bias would 
require a valid instrument for years of education. Nevertheless, the results of our attitudinal analysis suggest yet 
another link in the chain: low education and low income might be associated with the negative attitudes that are 
part of a ‘culture of poverty’. 
 
8.7 Education, poverty and subjective well-being 
Our final exercise is to examine the relationship between our central variables education, income, and 
health and a variable that can be regarded as providing a broader criterion than any of these for assessing the 
quality of life: happiness or subjective well-being. We are encouraged in this exercise by the rapidly growing 
literature on the economics of happiness which generally finds powerful regularities – involving statistically 
significant coefficients with the hypothesised signs – in many data sets.  It is arguable that ‘subjective well-being 
poverty’ is an encompassing concept into which income poverty and capabilities poverty can be incorporated 
(Kingdon and Knight, 2006). Our hypotheses are that, in improving subjective well-being, education, income 
and good health all help to reduce poverty defined in this encompassing sense. Any definition of poverty 
involves a value judgement on the part of the researcher, and subjective well-being poverty at least has the 
virtues of being based on individual choice, of concern for subjectively perceived misery, and of measurability. 
Survey respondents were asked how happy they were nowadays: very happy, happy, so-so, unhappy, or 
not at all happy. We convert this information into two forms of dependent variable, a binary variable  identifying 
those reporting themselves to be happy or very happy, and a cardinal variable ranging from very happy = 4 down 
to not at all happy = 0. The independent variables of most interest in our subjective well-being functions are the 
respondent’s years of schooling, a dummy variable indicating that the respondent reports being unhealthy, and ln 
income of the respondent’s household. The conditioning variables are whether the current living standard is 
reported to be lower, or higher, than five years ago, age and age squared, and dummies for male sex, marital 
status, and – to standardise for temporary effects - whether the respondent’s current mood is good. 
The choice of dependent variable makes no difference to the results, in line with the methodological 
conclusion of Ferrer-I-Carbonnel and Frijters (2004). In both cases all the relevant coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5 percent level (Table 27). The coefficient on years of schooling is positive. In the OLS equation, 
raising education from primary to high school increases the happiness score (mean value 2.68) by 0.036; in the 
logit equation it increases the probability of being happy or very happy by 3.0  percentage points, or by 4.8  
percent. This is of course in addition to the indirect effects of education on happiness via income and health. 
Insofar as causation runs from (past) education to (current) income and health, the full effect of education can be 
shown by omitting the latter variables. On their omission from the equation (not shown), the effect of education 
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is more than doubled: additional education raises the happiness score by 0.114 and the probability of being 
happy by 7.1  percentage points, or by 11.4 percent.  
When ln household income per capita is included, its coefficient has a significant positive value in the 
OLS equation (not shown) of 0.177. However, because income is potentially endogenous, we instrument the 
income variable: the OLS coefficient rises to 0.278, again highly significant. It appears that some unobserved 
variable (such as a driven personality) adds to income but subtracts from happiness. An increase in ln income per 
capita by one standard deviation increases the happiness score by 0.127 and the probability of being happy by 
7.4  percentage points, or by 11.9  percent. Being in poor health decreases happiness by 0.237 points and the 
probability of being happy by 13.7  percentage points, or by 22.0  percent.  
The conditioning variables behave as expected: we see the importance of comparisons with previous 
living standards, implying that relative income is relevant as well as absolute income; and the importance also of 
standardising for current mood. Age has the commonly found U-shaped relationship with happiness; men report 
being less happy than do women, and marriage is good for happiness. The crucial results, however, are that 
education, income and health each has the hypothesised effect on subjective well-being. 
 
9. Summary 
 
9.1 The seventeen relationships 
Our first objective in this section is to present the various results in a systemic way, showing that, on 
account of their many interactions, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  Only by considering all the 
relationships together can a coherent argument be developed. We take equations 1 – 5 and Figure 2 as our 
theoretical framework. Consider the evidence on each of the hypothesised relationships A,…, R in turn. 
 
A. Being in good health raises the income of the individual and of the household. Self-reported good health 
increases the number of hours worked by individuals in non-farm activities by 14.9 percent and in farm activities 
by 3.2 percent (Tables16 and 17). Standardising for hours worked, good health raises a worker’s non-farm 
income by 11.7 percent but has no significant effect on the household’s farm income (Tables 18 and 19). 
 
B. The logit equations predicting the health of an adult show that a one standard deviation fall in ln household 
income per capita raises the probability of being unhealthy by 1.1  percentage points, or by 6.5 percent (Table 
25). However, we lack evidence that parental poverty affects child health adversely. 
 
C. The logit equations predicting enrolment show that ill-health prejudices a child’s completion of middle 
school, increasing the chances of dropping out by 4.3 percentage points, or by 20.3 percent (Table 4), and of 
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continuation to high school, the reduced chances in this case being 3.4  percentage points, or 7.5 percent (Table 
5). However, neither effect is statistically significant, probably because there are few cases and because ill-health 
deters children from reaching even middle school. 
 
D. We have evidence that household poverty, as measured by income per capita and the existence of a credit 
constraint, has adverse effects both on completion of middle school and on continuation to high school. The logit 
equations predicting enrolment show that a one standard deviation decrease in ln household income per capita 
increases the probability of dropping out from middle school by 4.2  percentage points, or by 20.0 percent (Table 
4), and decreases the probability of continuing to high school by 18.1  percentage points, or by 39.5  percent 
(Table 5). Our other indicator of poverty, suffering a credit constraint, reduces the chances of completing middle 
school (Table 4). The effect is not statistically significant but, given the close relation between poverty and lack 
of credit, our finding of their joint significance is relevant. Lack of credit significantly reduces the chances of 
continuation to high school, by 19.1  percentage points, or by 39.6 percent (Table 5). 
 
E.  There is evidence that lower parental income means inferior educational quality for their children. We see 
this in Tables 11 and 12, where income per capita raises the total household expenditure per enrolled child, and 
where there is evidence of sibling competition for educational spending. An increase in household income by 
one standard deviation raises total household educational expenditure per enrolled child by 2.7, 3.7 and 4.3 
percent at primary, middle, and high school respectively. Income poverty and sibling competition increases the 
amount of time that children spend in farmwork and housework after school (Table 10). 
 
F.  There is also evidence that the education of children suffers if their parents are poorly    educated.  The 
mother’s education significantly encourages completion of middle school: if she has middle school instead of 
primary school education, the chances of dropout are reduced by 3.9  percentage points, or by 17.0 percent 
(Table 4). The education of each parent encourages continuation to high school: an additional three years of 
education for the father increases the chances of continuation by 4.2  percentage points, or by 9.2 percent (Table 
5). 
 
G. We found evidence that community enrolment is positively related to community income. A rise by one 
standard deviation in county income per capita raises the county enrolment rate by 5.2  percentage points, or by 
9.2 percent (Table 7). 
 
J. Community enrolment has a strong association with individual enrolment. A fall in the county relevant 
enrolment rate by one standard deviation reduces the chances of completing middle school by 6.4  percentage 
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points, or by 30.2 percent (Table 4). The same fall reduces the chances of continuing to high school by 16.5  
percentage points, or by 36.0 percent (Table 5). Whatever the mechanism by which this effect operates, 
educational poverty of the individual is closely linked to educational poverty in the community. 
 
K. Community income is a determinant of individual enrolment. In this case, however, the evidence runs counter 
to the hypothesis of a vicious circle of education- and income-poverty.  Higher income in the county has no 
significant effect on the chances of completing middle school (Table 4). However, a fall by one standard 
deviation in county income per capita increases the chances of continuation to high school by 13.3 percentage 
points, or by 29.0 percent, suggesting that the opportunity cost of high school is lower in poorer counties (Table 
5). 
 
L. The community also influences the quality of education that children receive. Some of the evidence on this is 
indirect and inconclusive, being based on differential returns to a year of schooling: a rise in county income per 
capita significantly raises the returns in non-farm activities and a rise in county educational expenditure per 
capita significantly raises the returns in farm activities (Table 8). There is a strong effect, at all three school 
levels, of household income per capita, county income per capita, and the county average of village educational 
expenditure per capita on the household’s expenditure per enrolled child (Tables 11 and 12). Our interpretation 
is that households demand a higher quality of education, and are prepared to pay for it, as their own income rises 
and as the quality of publicly provided education improves. 
 
I. The quality of education that a child receives, or expects to receive, has an effect on enrolment. We know that 
school performance is raised by expenditure on a child’s schooling, which in turn is influenced by household 
income per capita (Table 9), and that school performance is a powerful determinant of enrolment. Reported good 
performance in middle (or primary) school decreases the probability of drop-out from middle school by 19.0 
percentage points (Table 4) and increases the probability of continuing to high school by 32.5 percentage points 
(Table 5). The proportion of respondents in the county who are dissatisfied with the quality of secondary schools 
is significant in Table 4: a rise by one standard deviation in the proportion dissatisfied increases drop-out by 5.2 
percentage points. Mean high school fees in the county appear to be irrelevant at middle school level but have a 
positive effect on enrolment at high school level. A rise by one standard deviation in county high school fees – 
which we take to imply higher quality - raises the probability of high school enrolment by 9.2 percentage points 
(Table 5). 
 
M. Education is found to raise individual and household income.  It does so through an effect on hours worked 
and on the income per hour, in farm and non-farm activities.  The non-farm sector pays much better than does 
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the farm sector, both on average and at the margin (Table 14). A rise in the education of a worker from primary 
to high school level increases the number of hours worked in the non-farm sector by 47.1 percent (Table 16), and 
reduces those worked in farm activities by 11.5 percent (Table17). Standardising for hours worked, the marginal 
products of high school and of middle school are 417 and 481 yuan respectively in non-farming (Table18), and 
the corresponding marginal products are 40 and 67 yuan respectively in farming (Table 19). One of the ways in 
which education can raise income is by inculcating a positive attitude to innovation. Raising education from 
primary to high school level increases the probability of having a positive attitude to adopting new agricultural 
technology by 13.1 percentage points, or 19.6  percent (Table 26). As against these benefits of education, the fact 
that the returns to schooling are lower for low-income households and low-income counties helps to create and 
maintain a poverty trap (Table 21). Similarly, the returns to schooling are lower for traditional farming 
households than for those engaged in ‘modern’ farming activities (Table 22). 
 
N. We have indirect evidence that the quality of education that workers have received is a determinant of its 
economic benefit and therefore of their income. One indication is the willingness of parents to spend more on the 
education of their children the higher is their own income per capita and the higher the income per capita, and 
the average village educational expenditure per capita, in the county (Tables 11 and 12). This suggests that 
parents perceive a benefit from improved educational quality. Moreover, if all three county variables that we 
take to proxy the quality of education that workers have received are together increased by one standard 
deviation, although farm income is unaffected, non-farm income is raised by 22.0 percent (Table 18). 
 
O. Workers’ educational levels have an effect on their health status. Having completed high school instead of 
middle school, or middle school instead of primary school, reduces the probability of ill-health by 2.5 percentage 
points, or by 14.4 percent (Table 25). 
 
P. The logit equation predicting the determinants of subjective well-being imply that an   increase in education 
from primary school to high school level directly raises the probability of being happy or very happy by 3.0 
percentage points, or by 4.8  percent (Table 27).  This increase is 7.1  percentage points, equivalent to11.4  
percent, if the indirect effects of education, working through its influence on income and health, are included as 
well. 
 
Q. The same equation shows the effect of income on subjective well-being to be powerful. An increase in ln 
income per capita of the household by one standard deviation raises the probability of the respondent’s being 
happy by 7.4 percentage points, or by 11.9 percent (Table 27). 
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 R. Finally, from the same source we see that poor health has a serious adverse effect on subjective well-being: it 
reduces the probability of being happy by 13.7 percentage points, or by 22.0 percent (Table 27). Thus, given that 
subjective well-being is a criterion for poverty, we see that providing education, increasing income, and 
improving health can all reduce the risk of being in poverty. 
 
9.2 Can education break the vicious circle of poverty? 
We can now see why and how a poverty trap can exist. Low income restricts investment in education by 
households. Low education of the parents deters enrolment, as does low education in the community. Both low 
income and low education adversely affect health status; poor health status, in turn, reduces income and deters 
enrolment. Low income of the household and also of the community reduces the quality of education. Low 
quality of education in turn deters enrolment. Both low quantity and low quality of education reduce the income 
benefits of education. Low income, low education, and poor health all reduce subjective well-being, which can 
be viewed as an encompassing indication of poverty. Some of these relationships are short term but others are 
transmitted across generations, implying that household poverty can be persistent over the years. 
The interaction among the variables which has the potential to create a vicious circle also has the 
potential to create a virtuous circle, provided that a critical threshold can be surmounted. Using the simple 
analogy of Figure1, we see the following possibilities. There may be a single equilibrium at the (lower) point a, 
in which case the interactions simply move that equilibrium point upwards. There may instead be two stable 
equilibria, corresponding to points a and c, and an unstable equilibrium at point b.  The issue is whether a shock 
or intervention is sufficiently large to move the variables from the low-level equilibrium, a, beyond the critical 
threshold, b, so that they converge on the high-level equilibrium, c. We cannot tell from the evidence which of 
these cases is relevant. Nevertheless, consider four shocks or interventions.  
First, assume an exogenous shock which raises the household’s income. This has the potential to 
encourage enrolment and also to improve the quality of education demanded. Over a generation, these gains feed 
through into higher household income; this in turn improves health, which itself has knock-on effects on 
education and income. It also raises the quantity and quality of education of the next generation, with further 
indirect effects. Secondly, assume an exogenous shock that raises not only the income of the household but also 
that of its community. In addition to the consequences listed in the first example, there are benefits accruing 
from the greater public revenue of the community: higher quality of education, the possibility of a demonstration 
effect from a higher community enrolment rate, and the possibility of a higher rate of return to education as the 
structure of the local economy changes. By contrast, we also saw that the higher income of the community deters 
enrolment by raising the opportunity cost of school attendance. 
Thirdly, consider a policy intervention from above which is intended to improve the quantity and quality 
of education and is aimed at poor households. It will take time for the benefit from the educational improvement 
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to flow, in the form of increased household income, but eventually this rise will in turn improve health, with its 
beneficial effects, and also improve the quantity and quality of education received by the next generation. 
Fourthly, consider the same policy intervention, now aimed at poor communities. If all households in the 
community are targeted, in addition to the benefits accruing to each household described in the third case, there 
can be demonstration effects of the higher enrolment rate. If local governments are targeted, the intervention 
does not require the mediation of household demand to improve the quantity and quality of education supplied. 
Insofar as educational interventions raise income and ease credit constraints, on the one hand, and 
improve human capital, on the other, the ensuing increased access to funds for investment and enhanced 
profitability of investment may create further indirect effects through increased physical capital formation.  
 
10. Conclusions 
Section 9 has already provided a systemic summary of the paper. We draw three types of conclusion: 
first, concerning methodology and further research; second, on the relationships between education and poverty 
in a poor country, and how they throw light on the persistence of, and potential escape from, a poverty trap; 
third, on the implications of the research for policy in general and for rural China in particular.  
Most research papers in economics test one or two hypotheses: the research and its conclusions are 
specific and narrow. Broader conclusions might be drawn by introducing these research relationships into a more 
general system – by placing the results in the context of the research literature on related topics – but there is a 
natural reluctance to venture out in that way. 
In this paper we have taken a different approach. Our hypothesis is a very general one, which in turn 
gives rise to many sub-hypotheses, each of which requires empirical testing. In arguing the case we have had to 
adopt a broader, and therefore necessarily shallower, approach than is conventional in the research literature. The 
paper is also inevitably longer than is usual for journal articles. The trade-off is worth it because light cannot 
otherwise be thrown on an important general phenomenon viewed as a whole. Our combination of broad 
hypothesis and empirical estimation has not, to our knowledge, been previously attempted on this topic. 
The main lesson for research is the potential importance of educational quality – both for human capital 
formation and for the labour market benefits of education – and its relationship to poverty. Our findings suggest 
a need for further research on the causes and consequences of school quality. This in turn points to the use of 
tests of reasoning ability and cognitive achievement in the estimation of both educational achievement 
production functions and of human-capital-augmented income functions (an early example of which, for poor 
countries, was Boissiere et al., 1985). 
The main hypothesis of the paper is that there exist a set of relationships between income, or other 
indicators of poverty, and education. These run in two directions – from income to education and from education 
to income – and they interact among themselves in many ways. The upshot is that these processes can generate 
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reinforcing upward or downward pressures; in the latter case a vicious circle involving a low-level equilibrium 
for both education and income. 
No fewer than 17 hypothesised relationships A,…, R  were estimated, and then brought together in 
Section 9, where they were summarised individually and presented collectively to form a system. Given the 
inter-relatedness of the many variables in play, and the cross-section nature of the data set, it is difficult to isolate 
causation, as opposed to association, in some of the relationships. However, that task is less important in the 
present context than establishing that there is an inter-related and mutually reinforcing system of relationships. 
This set of relationships constitutes our evidence that an education-poverty, income-poverty trap can exist. 
Unobserved heterogeneity can pose a problem for establishing causality, but if omitted but correlated variables 
such as lack of personal ‘ability’ or ‘a culture of poverty’ are themselves determinants of poverty, they simply 
strengthen the poverty trap.  
Causation becomes important for understanding the underlying reasons for the problem and for 
assessing the effects of policy interventions. Knowledge of the causal relationships is crucial in devising  
policies that will engineer an escape from the poverty trap. For instance, in the absence of a good instrument for 
schooling, we cannot be sure that education will have the powerful effects on income that are implied by our 
estimates. For that, further, more detailed, research is required. An underlying policy issue is whether expanding 
educational enrolment alone would be sufficient or whether this should be accompanied by complementary 
policy interventions. These might aim to raise the prospective rate of return to education by, for instance, 
improving the quality of schooling, or improving opportunities in the local economy, or weakening a debilitating 
culture of poverty. 
Given a positive exogenous shock or policy intervention, there are two possibilities.  One is that the 
change may simply raise the position of the low-level equilibrium. The other is that interaction among the 
variables may set in train a process of cumulative causation and a virtuous circle generating a high-level 
equilibrium of both education and income. We cannot establish from our evidence that there are two equilibria 
and that a sufficiently large shock can move the system from one to another. Nevertheless, our findings of 
numerous positive relationships among a set of interacting variables opens that possibility. In any case, nothing 
in our general argument or policy implications hinges on the issue of whether there are two equilibria or just one, 
movable, equilibrium. 
The theory of a low-level equilibrium and the possibility of escape from it through a process of 
cumulative causation were pioneered fifty years ago (e.g. Leibenstein, 1957). Although never dormant, it has 
become popular again through endogenous growth theory, often involving human capital (e.g. Lucas, 1988, and 
applied to poverty by Azariadis, 2006) and the new emphasis on understanding persistent poverty (e.g. Ray, 
2004; Bowles, 2006). This paper provides some empirical support – rather lacking in the literature – for the role 
of education in the persistence of, and potential escape from, a poverty trap. 
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We turn to the policy implications of our findings. The issue for the poor in rural China is not only the 
quantity but also - and probably more so - the quality of education. Recall that the enrolment rates for 7-12, 13-
15, and 16-18 year-olds are 95, 90, and 55 percent respectively. It is true that we found income and credit 
constraints to be important in determining dropout from middle school and continuation to high school. 
However, enrolment decisions are partly governed by the quality of schooling that has already been received and 
the quality that is expected. 
There are huge differences in expenditure on the education of a child, both by local governments and by 
households, and these differences are in turn closely related to community and household income. The 
household differences occur both in school fees and in other educational expenditure such as books, uniforms, 
and private tuition. The quality of education, much influenced by expenditure, has its effect not only on the 
demand side (by influencing the perceived rate of return to education) but also on the supply side (by 
determining which children succeed in the competition for high school places). Thus, even in countries where 
the quantity of education causes serious policy concern, the quality of education may deserve no less research- 
and policy-attention. 
Consider the policy implications for rural China. The underlying problem for people in poor households, 
poor villages, or poor counties is the degree of fiscal decentralisation to be found in rural society. Chinese 
peasants are effectively expected to ‘pull themselves up by their own bootstraps’. The solution to the education-
poverty, income-poverty trap requires institutional reform: greater fiscal centralisation and equalisation – a 
theme that has already been stressed by the authors (Knight and Li, 1999). There should be more redistribution 
of tax revenue from higher to lower tiers of government, and from lower tiers of government to households. 
These redistributions should be aimed at the poor. 
The evidence suggests that the interventions should be made both at the household-level and at the local 
community-level. At the household-level, Chinese policy-makers might wish to introduce a version of the so-
called Progresa scheme, pioneered in Mexico in 1997 and subsequently adopted in several other Latin American 
countries. An advantage of such schemes is that they lend themselves to experimental interventions designed to 
measure their effects accurately: the findings so far have been promising (Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001). 
The Progresa scheme is intended to address extreme poverty in rural areas of Mexico by developing the 
human capital of the poor. The recipients are poor families in poor communities. The scheme encourages school 
enrolment by providing conditional subsidies: it is necessary for parents to send their children to school. By 
contrast, in the Chinese conditions of high enrolment rates, such a scheme might well have its main effect on the 
quality of education that households demand; or if necessary the scheme could be adapted so as to promote the 
quality of education. The lower tiers of government could similarly receive conditional revenue transfers, the 
requirements of which would involve taking measures to improve the quality of education that local 
governments provide. 
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The Chinese government has indeed begun to move in this direction. As part of the recently declared 
policy of promoting the ‘Harmonious Society’, the educational burden on rural households has been 
progressively lightened. In 2001 the central government began to provide free textbooks for poor pupils 
attending compulsory education (years 1-9) in officially designated poor counties. In 2005 it introduced a policy 
of also exempting them from the payment of tuition fees and of providing them with accommodation subsidies. 
Government funding for exemption from tuition fees was extended to all pupils in western provinces in 2006 and 
to all provinces in 2007. Thus there are no longer tuition fees for compulsory education in rural China but 
measures to maintain and improve the quality of education may also be needed. 
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Figure 1. A poverty trap 
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Figure 2. Vicious and virtuous circles 
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Table 1. Educational enrolments and expenditures by income per capita quintile  
 
                                                                    Income quintile                                                    Total 
                                                _______________________________________________ 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
Distribution of 15-16 year- 
olds by educational status 
(column  percentage) 
      
  early dropouts 47.6 21.4 19.4 19.9 13.5 25.8 
  middle school graduates 23.5 20.7 23.1 15.1 12.8 19.2 
  high school pupils 28.8 57.9 57.5 65.1 73.7 55.0 
       
Enrolment rate of 15-18 year-
olds ( percentage) 
 
52.3 
 
62.0 
 
62.8 
 
65.4 
 
72.5 
 
62.7 
       
Educational expenditure as a 
proportion of household 
income ( percentage) 
 
 
25.5 
 
 
13.9 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
7.1 
 
 
13.0 
 
 
Notes: 1. The categories excluded from the distribution of 15-16 year-olds are the negligible few who have 
never attended school and the children who are still enrolled in middle school: their choices will 
be made later. 
 2. Simulated income rather than actual income is used throughout (see section 6). 
 
 
Table 2. Educational expenditure per child in school, in the bottom, middle and top third of 
households by household income per capita and by county income per capita, by age group 
 Household income per capita 
___________________________________________ 
 bottom 
third 
middle 
third 
top 
third 
ratio of top 
to bottom 
Age group 7-12     
        tuition 171.5 234.5 289.8 1.69 
        other 167.0 207.8 317.8 1.90 
        total expenditure 338.5 442.3 607.6 1.79 
     
Age group 13-15     
        tuition 310.2 405.5 551.1 1.78 
        other 344.2 410.1 538.9 1.57 
        total expenditure 654.4 815.4    1090.0 1.67 
     
Age group 16-18     
        tuition 623.8 975.1    1478.3 2.37 
        other 557.5 777.8    1254.6 2.25 
        total expenditure       1181.3     1752.9    2732.9 2.31 
 
     
 County income per capita 
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Age group 7-12     
        tuition 152.8 232.3 327.8 2.14 
        other 156.6 197.2 334.5 2.14 
        total expenditure 309.4 429.5 662.3 2.14 
     
Age group 13-15     
        tuition 279.4 429.1 593.4 2.12 
        other 319.3 393.5 609.4 1.91 
        total expenditure 598.7 822.6    1202.8 2.01 
     
Age group 16-18     
        tuition 733.1 946.0    1466.0 2.00 
        other 583.2 770.8    1260.8 2.16 
        total expenditure       1316.3 1716.8    2726.8 2.07 
     
 
 
 
Table 3. Status of children who are currently out of school, by age group, column  percentage 
  
Age group 
___________________________________________________________ 
  
7-12 
 
13-15 
 
16-18 
 
Working  6.3              23.7 72.3 
Unemployed 29.1              19.7 10.2 
Disabled  4.0 1.8 1.0 
Pre-school 32.6 0.4 0.0 
Housework  1.1 6.6 4.5 
‘Dropout’ 10.9               39.1 4.5 
Other 
 
26.9 8.7 7.5 
Observations 
 
            175             274          1,258 
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Table 4.The determinants of drop-out from middle school, binary logit estimates__ 
  
1 
___________________ 
coefficient   marginal 
 
2 
____________________ 
coefficient        marginal 
 
     
simulated ln income per capita   -0.479*** -0.055   
simulated ln income per capita     
      quintile 1   0.698 * 0.092 
      quintile 2     -0.210      -0.023 
      quintile 3       0.000 0.000 
      quintile 4     -0.030     -0.003 
      quintile 5     -0.423     -0.044 
credit-constrained      1.031 0.165     1.076 0.174 
disaster in 2002   0.458** 0.055   0.451*       0.053 
father’s years of education   -0.011   -0.001   -0.014     -0.002 
mother’s years of education -0.108**   -0.012   -0.114** -0.013 
one or more brothers    0.080 0.009     0.117  0.013 
one or more sisters     0.071    0.008    0.085       0.010 
male    0.515**    0.058  0.545**  0.061 
good performance in middle school   -1.638***   -0.183  -1.695*** -0.187 
one or both parents a migrant     0.016 0.002   -0.009 -0.001 
county simulated ln mean income     0.611 0.070    0.519  0.059 
county migrant density  -2.244**   -0.257   -2.266** -0.256 
distance to nearest middle school     0.026 0.003     0.024  0.003 
county proportion of adults 25-34 who 
   completed high school 
  -5.230*** -0.598   -5.493*** -0.621 
county proportion dissatisfied with  
   secondary schools 
0.406 0.046     0.356  0.040 
county rate of return in farming   -27.862    -3.186 -29.164 -3.297 
province rate of return in non-farming     -6.695 -0.765   -4.850 -0.548 
county enrolment rate for 15-16 year olds   -3.011*** -0.344   -3.041*** -0.344 
designated poor county -0.210 -0.023   -0.266 -0.028 
ill-health 0.287 0.036     0.196 0.024 
intercept      1.686      1.649  
     
mean of dependent variable 0.212  0.212  
pseudo R-squared 0.254  0.256  
number of observations  631   631  
 
 
 
Notes: 1. We use simulated rather than instrumented income; the latter has a similar but slightly smaller 
coefficient on ln income per capita and has less statistical significance. 
 
 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the county level.
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Table 5. The determinants of continuation from middle school to high school: binary logit estimates 
  
1 
    ___________________ 
     coefficient   marginal 
 
2 
____________________ 
coefficient        marginal 
 
    
simulated ln income per capita 0.775*** 0.191   
simulated ln income per capita  
      quintile 1   -1.003*** -0.232
      quintile 2   -0.068 -0.017
      quintile 3     0.000 0.000
      quintile 4     0.356** 0.088
      quintile 5    0.715*** 0.177
credit-constrained      -0.967** - 0.211   -0.912** -0.202
father’s years of schooling     0.057*      0.014    0.064** 0.016
mother’s years of schooling     0.040*      0.010    0.042* 0.010
one or more brothers     -0.293**  -0.072   -0.281* -0.069
one or more sisters        -0.168     -0.041   -0.157 -0.039
good performance in middle school 1.362***      0.325    1.362*** 0.325
male      0.229**      0.056  0.240** 0.059
one or both parents a migrant 0.489***   0.122    0.490*** 0.122
county ln simulated mean income      -1.128*** -0.278   -1.028*** -0.254
county migration density     1.408**     0.347    1.333*** 0.329
county proportion of adults 25-34 who 
  completed high-school 
       1.197 0.295    0.988 0.244
county proportion of children in key  
  schools 
       0.599 0.148    0.460 0.113
county mean school fees 2.166*** 0.534    2.257*** 0.557
county proportion dissatisfied with  
   secondary schools 
0.461*** 0.114    0.450*** 0.111
county rate of return in farming       15.195** 3.744 15.524** 3.830
province rate of return in non-farming        5.759 1.419 5.446 1.344
county enrolment rate for15-18 year olds    3.840*** 0.946 3.799*** 0.937
designated poor county      -0.029      -0.007  0.025 0.006
ill-health  
intercept 
     -0.141 
     -6.312*** 
    -0.034 -0.092 
-5.887*** 
         -0.023 
    
mean of dependent variable     0.458   0.458  
pseudo R-squared     0.250   0.243  
number of observations 1,822  1,822  
 
Notes: As for Table 4.
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Table 6. The determinants of drop-out from middle school and the continuation to high school, 
restricted model with income instrumented 
                                                                        drop-out                                          continuation 
                                                            _______________________      _____________________ 
                                                                  coefficient      marginal         coefficient       marginal 
 
income (instrumented)    -0.656** -0.202   0.385**   0.148 
good performance in middle school    -0.838*** -0.244   0.811***   0.307 
male     0.020   0.006   0.119**   0.046   
county rate of return in farming   -8.154 -2.506 13.611***   5.222 
intercept      0.231   -1.168***  
Wald chi-sq   85.58  264.97  
number of observations      753                        2262  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: 1. The Stata program ivprobit maximum likelihood is used. 
 2. The identifying variables in the income equation are: whether the village leader has experience of 
running a business, whether the village had to sell grain at the officially specified price in 2002, 
and whether the terrain of the village is plain (the reference category), hilly or mountainous. All 
four variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
 3. The test of over-identifying instruments (indicating that if one instrument is valid then at least one 
other instrument is also valid) is passed in the continuation but not in the drop-out equation. In 
both equations, the Wald test of exogeneity indicates that we cannot reject the hypotheses that 
income is exogenous 
 
 
 
Table 7. The determinants of the county enrolment rate for those aged 16-18, OLS 
estimates 
 
Simulated county income per capita  
 
    0.040** 
 
   0.054*** 
Return to a year of education in farming in the county     1.958     2.154 
Return to a year of education in non-farming in the province      1.286     1.552* 
Proportion of pupils 16-18 in the county who attend key schools     0.905**     1.136*** 
Proportion of adults 25-34 in the county who completed  
      high school 
    0.482**  
Proportion of the labour force in the county who are in local  
      non-farming 
    0.160     0.191 
Constant term     0.236***     0.243*** 
   
Adjusted R-squared     0.336     0.276 
Mean of dependent variable     0.563     0.563 
No of observations  
 
122 122 
 
Note:                ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the one per cent, five per cent and ten per cent levels 
respectively. 
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Table 8. The determinants of the county-level returns to education: OLS estimates  
  
Farming 
 
Non-farming 
 
 
household income per capita in county 
 
    0.000 
 
    0.005*** 
 household educational expenditure per capita in county      0.225**     0.132 
county proportion of adults aged 25-34 who attended key schools     0.009    -0.004 
intercept     0.011***     0.026*** 
   
mean value of dependent variable     0.014     0.040 
adjusted R-squared      0.037     0.053 
number of observations 122 122 
   
 
Notes:  1. County educational expenditure is village educational expenditure per capita with weighted aggregation to 
the county level. 
2. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 9. The determinants of school performance of children aged 13-18, binary logit analysis 
  
Coefficients 
______________________ 
     
          (1)                    (2) 
 
 
Marginal effects 
_______________ 
 
(1)             (2) 
 
 
Male 
 
   -0.055 
 
    -0.048 
 
  -0.014 
 
 -0.012 
Father’s years of schooling 0.068***     -0.061*** 0.017  0.015 
Mother’s years of schooling 0.059***      0.048*** 0.015  0.012 
Ln simulated household income per capita      0.121**      0.046 0.030  0.012 
Ln expenditure on child’s schooling       0.231***   0.058 
 
Child works after school     -0.165**     -0.088   -0.041 -0.022 
Child not in good health -0.826***     -0.844***   -0.197 -0.200 
Constant term -1.685***     -2.589***   
     
Pseudo- R-squared       0.028       0.027   
Mean of dependent variable       0.504       0.500   
Number of observations 3,564 3,323   
 
 
 
Notes:    1.   The dependent variable is (self-reported) excellent or good performance at middle school (or, if middle 
school was not attended, at primary school) = 1. 
   2.   The dummy variable for work is child does farmwork or housework after school during school terms = 
1, and the dummy variable for health is child’s health is so-so, bad, or very bad = 1. 
     3.    ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the one, five and ten per cent level respectively. 
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Table 10. Logit model indicating that a child always performs certain activities after school: 
children aged 6-16 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
Farmwork 
 
Childcare 
 
Housework 
 
Simulated income per capita        -0.005***       0.000 -0.005*** 
at least one parent a migrant        -0.026*      -0.019**      -0.016 
attendance at key school       -0.060***      -0.017 -0.100*** 
school fee (000 yuan)       -0.029***      -0.003 -0.031*** 
age (years)         0.024***   -0.004***  0.024*** 
male 0.010   -0.024*** -0.068*** 
minority group      0.100***        0.008   0.154*** 
younger sibling at school      0.039***     0.020*** 0.085*** 
younger sibling not at school  0.032*     0.266***       0.017 
county educational expenditure per capita   -0.986**        0.300      -3.656***  
county proportion of pupils aged 15-18 
in key schools 
      -0.018      -0.030 -0.144*** 
intercept 0.026    0.151***      -0.008 
    
mean value of dependent variable 0.226       0.074       0.352 
pseudo R-squared 0.055       0.133       0.095 
number of observations  6333 6294 6328 
    
 
Notes: 1. The dependent variable is ‘always performs farmwork after school’ = 1; and equivalently for 
childcare and for housework. 
2. The county educational expenditure per capita variable is created by aggregating village educational 
expenditure per capita to the county level. 
3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
4. Other variables in the equations but not reported are older sibling working, older sibling not working, 
older sibling not in school, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, county enrolment rate, and county 
income per capita.  
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Table 11. The determinants of total household expenditure per enrolled child at primary, 
middle and high school: OLS estimates  
 
 
 
Primary school 
 
Middle school 
 
High school 
 
 
ln simulated income per capita  
 
      0.011*** 
 
       0.039*** 
 
     0.035*** 
      
at least one parent a migrant        0.017        0.099**      0.277 
older sibling working     -0.011        0.002     -0.525*** 
older sibling at school      -0.046***       -0.017     -0.396* 
younger sibling at school     -0.030***       -0.092***     -0.402*** 
younger sibling not at school     -0.055***       -0.044     -0.668* 
attendance at key school         0.699***      0.622*** 
minority group     -0.103***      -0.296***      0.010 
distance to closest middle school (km)         0.019***      0.047*** 
county income per capita       0.111***        0.167***      0.668*** 
county educational expenditure per 
capita  
      1.336***        5.197***    15.884** 
county proportion of pupils 15-18 in key schools      -0.022        0.223*      1.049 
    
intercept        0.379***        0.483**      1.355*** 
    
mean value of dependent variable (000 yuan)        0.426        0.882       2.566 
adjusted R-squared        0.252        0.152       0.261 
number of observations 3,643 2,555   683 
    
 
Notes: 1.   ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
2. Other variables in the equations but not reported are male, credit constraint applies, and county 
enrolment rate. 
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Table 12. The sensitivity of household educational expenditure components to household income 
and public educational expenditure: OLS estimates  
 
 
 
Primary school 
 
Middle school 
 
High school 
 
ln total expenditure per child    
       simulated household income  0.015***  0.018***  0.017** 
       county income per capita .0.060***  0.068***  0.125*** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
 0.178  1.163**  2.665* 
    
ln tuition fee per child    
       simulated household income  0.053***  0.019  0.015 
       county income per capita  0.120***  0.083**  0.168*** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
-0.981  5.485*  5.229 
    
ln other expenditure per child    
       simulated household income  0.060***  0.031**  0.013 
       county income per capita  0.130***  0.120***  0.111** 
       educational expenditure by local  
       government  
 2.219  2.465  5.664 
    
    
 
Notes: 1. Simulated income is income minus income earned by children in the relevant age group (primary 7-
12, middle 13-15, high school 16-18 years). County income per capita is the average household 
income per capita of all sampled households in the county. Educational expenditure by local 
government is the average village per capita expenditure on education aggregated to the county level. 
2. The OLS estimates contain all the explanatory variables of Table 12, but only the coefficients of the 
three variables of most interest are reported. 
3. Since the dependent variables are in logarithmic form, the coefficients represent the  percentage 
increase in expenditure attributable to a unit increase in each explanatory variable. 
3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively.
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Table 13. Labour allocation of workers among farm, local non-farm, and migration activities: row  
percentages  
 Farming Non-farming 
______________________________ 
     local         migration           total 
Ratio of 
migration 
to local 
non-farm 
 
full sample 
 
63.7 
 
22.1 
 
14.2 
 
36.3 
 
64 
poorest third of households 75.0 11.7 13.3 25.0     114 
richest third of households 51.7 33.8 14.5 48.3 43 
poorest third of counties 71.4 12.4 16.2 28.6 131 
richest third of counties 54.0 33.8 12.2 46.0  36 
poorest half of households in 
poorest half of counties  
 
73.0 
 
11.9 
 
15.1 
 
27.0 
 
127 
workers aged under 30 51.1 18.6 30.4 48.9 163 
workers aged under 30 in 
poorest half of households in 
poorest half of counties 
 
 
63.0 
 
 
9.6 
 
 
27.5 
 
 
37.0 
 
 
287 
      
 
Note: The criterion for classification between farm and non-farm activity is the predominant 
 number of hours worked, and between local non-farming and migration whether the  
 worker is in or out of the county. 
 
 
Table 14. Average and marginal returns per hour of labour in farming and non-farming 
 
 
 
 
Average returns 
 
  Marginal returns 
               (1)                     (2) 
            ___________________ 
farming 1.44 0.012 0.017 
non-farming 
 of which: local non-farming 
2.75 
3.08 
0.143  
0.167 
                 migration 2.04  0.122 
ratio of non-farming to farming 1.91         11.92  
ratio of local non-farming to migration 1.51      1.37 
    
 
Notes: 1. The marginal returns per hour are based on income functions which contain productive fixed assets 
and farmland as well as hours worked in the different activities as the explanatory variables 
 2. All the coefficients in the income functions are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 15. The determinants of activity choice among farming, local non-farming and migration: 
multinomial logit analysis 
 Local non-farming 
______________________ 
Migration 
_______________________ 
 
 coefficient marginal 
 
coefficient marginal 
 
 
male 
 
         1.397*** 
 
 0.183 
 
 1.231*** 
 
 0.067 
age          0.084***  0.013  -0.021 -0.003 
age squared         -0.001***   -0.0002  -0.001***   -0.0001 
college           1.811***  0.355  0.997***  0.025 
professional school          1.583***  0.291  1.072***  0.046 
high school          0.900***  0.146  0.680***  0.037 
middle school          0.657***  0.090  0.528***  0.029 
primary school          0.263***  0.035  0.346***  0.023 
healthy          0.174*** 0.020  0.407***  0.025 
farm land (mu)        -0.053*** -0.007 -0.048*** -0.003 
county migration density         2.266***  0.198  9.565***  0.672 
county non-farm labour density         5.674***  0.796  3.326***  0.162 
intercept        -5.263***  -3.044***  
pseudo R-squared    0.284    
mean value of dependent variables    0.221    
number of observations 
 
22,220    
 
Notes: 1. The activities farming, local non-farming and migration are defined in Table 14. Farming is the 
reference activity (with coefficients equal to zero). 
 2. Several explanatory variables were included in the specification but are not reported in the table, 
including whether the worker has children, has army experience, has suffered a national disaster in 
the previous year, lives in an officially designated poverty county, etc. 
 3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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Table 16. The determinants of hours worked in non-farm activities by individuals, Tobit estimates 
  
Coefficients 
 
Marginals 
 
 
Due to: 
____________________ 
 
     intensity   participation 
 
 
male 
 
    1099.45*** 
 
503.61
 
171.76 
 
331.85
age 17.30**     7.92     2.70     5.22
age squared   -0.61***   -0.28   -0.10   -0.19
healthy       237.34*** 108.71   37.08  71.63
county farm wage       -37.79*** -17.31   -5.90 -11.41
county non-farm wage  74.95***  34.33  11.71  22.62
college   1,412.63*** 647.06 220.68 426.38
professional school   1,370.90*** 627.95 214.16 413.78
high school   1,038.34*** 475.61 162.21 313.40
middle school       724.69*** 331.95 113.21 218.74
primary school      284.99*** 130.54 44.52   86.02
number of children under 16      -57.30*** -26.25 -8.95 -17.29
number of elderly over 65      -45.87 -21.01 -7.17 -13.84
intercept -2,264.48***    
     
mean value of dependent variable      731.74    
pseudo R–squared          0.021    
number of observations 22,172    
number of uncensored observations 10,156    
     
 
Notes: 1. The McDonald-Moffitt decomposition is conducted to separate the change in non-farm hours 
worked into that part due to change in the number of non-farm hours worked (if positive) and that 
part due to change in the probability of working non-farm hours (if zero). 
 2. The sample comprises all persons who are currently working and aged under 65 years. 
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Table 17. The determinants of hours worked in farm activities by individuals, Tobit estimates 
  
Coefficients
 
Marginals
 
Due to: 
_____________________ 
 
      intensity    participation 
 
 
male 
 
94.12***
 
80.20
 
51.58 
 
28.62
age 92.39*** 78.72 50.96 28.28
age squared -0.10*** -0.85 -0.55 -0.31
healthy        35.49**   30.24 19.53 10.84
farm land (mu) 8.56*** 7.29 4.71 2.61
productive fixed assets (000 yuan) 10.81*** 9.21 5.92 3.29
number of workers -37.03*** -31.55 -20.30 -11.26
predicted non-farm hours -0.46*** -0.40 -0.25 -0.14
county non-farm wage -16.36*** -13.94 -8.98 -4.98
college -488.48*** -416.22 -267.50 -148.46
professional school -399.48*** -340.39 -218.74 -121.40
high school -158.80*** -135.30 -87.05 -48.31
middle school -133.98*** -114.16 -73.44 -40.76
primary school         -29.27 -24.94 -15.99 -8.87
number of children under 16 26.65*** 22.71 14.35 7.96
number of elderly over 65           17.45 14.87 6.31 3.50
intercept -380.30***    
    
mean value of dependent variable    955.71    
pseudo R–squared    0.034    
number of observations 22,172    
number of uncensored observations  18,892    
     
 
Notes: as for Table 16
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Table 18. The determinants of non-farm income of individuals, OLS estimates 
      ln non-farm  
income 
         ln non-farm      
income            
absolute non farm 
income (yuan) 
 
male       0.140*** 0.086*** 305.1***
age       0.053*** 0.058*** 223.8***
age squared      -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -2.37***
healthy       0.108** 0.111***            213.2* 
non-farm hours (instrumented)       0.078*** 0.082*** 218.0***
college       0.600*** 0.734*** 4214.0***
professional school       0.425*** 0.548*** 1986.9***
high school       0.235*** 0.319*** 1003.0***
middle school       0.173*** 0.233*** 585.9***
primary school       0.059           0.078          105.3 
intercept       4.780*** 4.849*** -5,413.4***
county proportion of adults 25-34 who 
completed high school 
      0.856 
county mean school fees       0.772*** 
county proportion dissatisfied with 
secondary schools 
      -0.244 
 
mean of dependent variable       7.628            7.628 3,780 
adjusted R-squared       0.434            0.416               0.274 
number of observations 9,513          9,513 9,513 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
             Notes:    1.The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the county level. 
                            2. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. 
                            3. The test for joint significance of the three variables representing quality of education in column 1, F (3, 119) 
= 11.04, is highly significant.
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Table 19. The determinants of farm income of households, OLS estimates 
  
       ln farm income 
 
 
absolute farm 
income (yuan)
 
farm land (mu) 
 
0.042*** 
 
245.8***
productive fixed assets  0.041*** 257.3***
proportion of workers healthy           -0.024        54.1  
(instrumented) hours worked by members with:   
college               0.029*        79.9 
professional school 0.047*** 272.7***
high school 0.037*** 167.8***
middle school 0.031*** 141.4***
primary school 0.028*** 97.0***
no education 0.017***          19.3* 
intercept 7.548*** 2,255.0***
  
mean of dependent variable             8.161 5,375.8 
adjusted R-squared            0.183            0.215 
number of observations           8,603        8,603 
  
 
Notes: 1. Farm land is measured in mu, productive fixed assets in 000 yuan, and hours worked in 000 hours. 
 2. Hours worked are instrumented using the equation reported in Table 17. 
3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 20. Simulation analysis: the effects on measures of income poverty of improving the 
education of the labour force  
 Actual case Middle school 
the minimum 
 
High school 
the minimum 
 
average farm income 
 
1,275 
 
         1,206 
 
1,174 
average non-farm income 1,017           1,411 2,069 
average other income    432              432    432 
average overall income 2,592           3,050 3,675 
average farm hours    649              608   564 
average non-farm hours    458              555   700 
poverty rate ( percent):    
      $1 a day        10.9 2.5          0.4 
      $2 a day        43.0 27.0          8.4 
    
 
Notes: 1. The simulations are based on the equations reported in Tables 16-19. 
 2. The first simulation assumes that workers without education or only primary school are raised to 
middle school completion. The second assumes that all workers with less education are raised to 
high school completion. 
 3. The $1 and £2 a day criteria are converted into 2002 prices in rural China: 925 yuan and 1,850 yuan 
respectively.   
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Table 21. The returns to education in farm, non-farm, and combined activities, by income category 
 
 
 
 
Farm 
 
Non-farm 
 
Combined 
 
whole sample 
 
   0.015*** 
 
   0.108*** 
 
0.064*** 
    
poorest third of households    0.006    0.060*** 0.020*** 
richest third of households 0.017**    0.081*** 0.045*** 
    
poorest third of counties    0.005    0.086*** 0.047*** 
richest third of counties    0.019*    0.068*** 0.064*** 
    
poorest half of households in poorest half of counties     0.008    0.070*** 0.033*** 
richest half of households in richest half of counties    0.021***    0.079*** 0.054*** 
    
 
Notes: 1. The non-farm equations use individual data and the farm and combined equations use household 
data. 
 2. In the farm equations the dependent variable is ln household farm income per capita and the 
explanatory variables are maximum years of education among workers engaged in farming, 
maximum age among workers engaged in farming and its square, cultivated land (mu) and ln 
productive fixed assets. The inclusion of the variable input, farm hours, makes very little difference 
to the estimates of returns. 
 3. In the non-farm equations the dependent variable is ln individual income and the explanatory 
variables are years of education, age and age squared. When ln non-farm hours is included the 
coefficients all fall, reflecting education’s influence on the probability and extent of non-farm work. 
 4. In the combined equations the dependent variable is ln household income per capita and the 
explanatory variables are maximum years of schooling among workers in the household, maximum 
age among workers in the household, ln cultivated land (mu), and ln productive fixed assets. 
5. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels
 respectively. 
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Table 22. Returns to education in farming households: OLS estimates 
 
 
Column: 
 
1 
 
2 
 
average years of schooling 
 
    0.042*** 
 
     0.027*** 
modern     0.284***    0.140** 
modern * average years of schooling            0.021** 
land (mu)     0.023***      0.023*** 
ln productive fixed assets (000 yuan)        0.019**        0.019*** 
intercept     7.978***      8.084*** 
  
mean of dependent variable        8.719           8.719 
adjusted R-squared        0.169           0.170 
number of observations 4,719    4,719 
   
 
Notes: 1. ‘Farming households’ are those that derive a majority of their income from farm activities. 
 2. ‘Modern farming households’ are those that derive a majority of their farm income from grain 
production. 
 3. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively 
 4. The dependent variable is ln household farm income. 
 
 
 
Table 23. Simulation analysis for the poorest third of households: the effects on measures of income 
poverty of improving the education of the labour force  
 
 
 
Actual case Middle school 
the minimum 
High school 
the minimum 
 
average farm income 
 
            769 
 
           718 
 
                   698 
average non-farm income             334            443                  596 
average other income               85              85                   85 
average overall income          1,072         1,247              1,379 
average farm hours             682            635                 613 
average non-farm hours             262            324                 410 
poverty rate ( percent)  
    $1 a day 32.5 21.1 11.7
    $2 a day 100.0 96.7 92.2
    
 
Notes: As for Table 20, except that the simulations are based on the specifications reported in Table 16-19 but 
estimated for the sub-sample of households in the lowest third of household income per capita. 
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Table 24. Simulation analysis for households with heads aged under 30 years: the effects on 
measures of income poverty of improving the education of the labour force  
 
 
 
Actual case Middle school 
the minimum 
High school 
the minimum 
 
average farm income 
 
          1,158 
 
         1,078 
 
                   950 
average non-farm income             637          1,282              2,387 
average other income             440             440                  440 
average overall income          2,145         2,800              3,777 
average farm hours             663            663                 513 
average non-farm hours             321            397                 567 
poverty rate ( percent)  
    $1 a day 16.8                  1.8                        0.4 
    $2 a day                  52.6                24.7                        5.2 
    
 
Notes: As for Table 20, except that the simulations are based on the specifications reported in Table 16-19 but 
estimated for the sub-sample of households for which the household head is aged under 30 years. 
 
 
Table 25. The determinants of health status among adults, binary logit analysis 
  
Coefficient 
 
Marginal 
 
 
Mean value 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
male 
 
 -0.244*** 
 
-0.0284 
 
    0.5273 
 
0.4993 
age in years   0.058***  0.0067     38.21     15.25 
age squared      0.00002***  0.0000 1692.61 1296.24 
years of schooling -0.072*** -0.0083     7.0926 2.9733 
predicted ln income per capita -0.192*** -0.0222     7.7706 0.5076 
intercept -1.978***     
     
pseudo R-squared          0.1518    
proportion unhealthy        17.38    
number of observations 28,729    
     
Notes: 1. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the respondent reports being so-so, unhealthy or 
very unhealthy, and of zero if healthy or very healthy. 
2. The omitted category in the dummy variable analysis is female. 
3. *** denotes significance at the one per cent level. 
4. Very similar results were obtained from an ordered probit estimation using all five  
 categories of health status. 
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Table 26. The determinants of a positive attitude towards new agricultural technology:  
binary logit analysis 
 
 
 
  
Coefficient  
 
Marginal       
 
male 
  
     0.082 
 
0.017 
age            0.074*** 0.015 
age squared -0.0008*** -0.0002 
years of schooling            0.110*** 0.023 
ln household income per capita             0.088*** 0.018 
intercept          -2.167***  
    
mean of dependent variable             70.00  
pseudo R-squared      0.019  
number of observations     4,725  
    
 
Notes: 1. The means and standard deviations of years of schooling are 6.935 and 2.506, and those of ln 
household income per capita are 8.888 and 0.651 respectively. 
        2.      ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels     
respectively. 
        3.    Ln household income per capita is instrumented using productive fixed assets, land,  
average years of schooling of household workers, number of farm hours worked, number of non-
farm hours worked, number of household members, whether the terrain is mountainous, hilly, or 
plain, and a set of province dummy variables. 
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Table 27. The determinants of subjective well-being: binary logit and OLS estimates 
 
Happiness measure: 
 
 
happy or very happy 
________________________ 
 
       coefficient                marginal 
 
happiness score 
 
 
coefficient 
 
years of schooling  
  
      0.020** 
 
      0.005 
 
      0.006** 
ln income per capita (instrumented)  0.703***       0.162        0.278*** 
poor health  -0.573***     -0.137       -0.237*** 
current living standard higher   0.742***       0.173        0.307*** 
current living standard lower  -0.357***     -0.085       -0.256*** 
age     -0.016     -0.004       -0.012** 
age squared         0.0003*        0.0001   0.0002***
male  -0.165***     -0.038       -0.061*** 
married  0.487***            0.117        0.260*** 
good mood  1.286***       0.301        0.506*** 
intercept   -6.464***   -0.023 
     
mean of dependent variable    0.622   2.681 
pseudo/adjusted R-squared          0.142           0.212 
number of observations   8,861    8,861 
  
 
Notes: 1. The dependent variable is happy or very happy = 1, so-so, unhappy, or not at all happy = 0 
(estimated using binary logit), or a cardinal variable with very happy = 4, happy = 3, so-so = 2, 
unhappy = 1, not so happy = 0 (estimated using OLS). 
 2. The independent variables include dummies for current living standard which is higher than five 
years ago, and current living standard which is lower than five years ago, with the omitted category 
being current living standard the same; self-reported poor health, with other replies being the 
omitted category; and self-reported good mood, with other replies being the omitted category. 
 3. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
 4.    Ln household income per capita is instrumented using productive fixed assets, land,   
        average years of schooling of household workers, number of farm hours worked, number of non-farm 
hours worked, number of household members, whether the terrain is mountainous, hilly or plain, 
and a set of province dummy variables 
 
